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REFLECTIONS ON BUDDHISM AND ITS PROBLEMS *

RYUSAKU TSUNODA

Former Lecturer in Japanese Religion and Thought, Columbia University

BECAUSE OF MY LIFELONG INTEREST IN BUDDHISM, I have quite often been a victim of uneasy apprehension about the future of Buddhism in our world of today. The oldest of three great world religions, preceding Christianity by half a millenium, Buddhism at one time held its gentle and persuasive sway over the major portion of the largest continent. Its domain contained various linguistic areas besides its native Indo-European, such as Tibeto-Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese, distinguished by the scriptual texts in vogue. Having reached the zenith of its influence in medieval ages, however, Buddhism started to lose ground, and in modern times it has given way, all along the line, before the advance of new and younger forms of teachings, except in three scattered regions of Asia.

The loss of its native land of India was a tragedy. As we all know, not Buddhism but Brahminism was the first-born religion of the land. It was based on the right of prerogative of the Aryan conquerors, and was the guardian of that rigid caste system of Brāhman, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, and Śūdra which still lingers as the perennial curse of the land. Buddhism had its inception as a protest by a Kṣatriya against Brāhman domination. The geographic center of Brāhman culture was in the Indus plain, but, by the sixth century B.C., the fertile frontier region of the Gangetic plain was steadily growing prosperous. In that far off frontier land, in the latter part of the century, a light, the new light, came to Siddhārtha Gautama, a son of Śākya, of the second caste. This was the beginning of Buddhism. Buddha is a name taken from the Sanskrit term *Bodhi* meaning "light." It was a new religion based, not on the right of the dominant caste, but on the light attained by an individual through his own striving. A new political center known as the Maurya dynasty also developed in this region. The re-

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ligion of the Śākya rose in influence with the rise of this empire. Two of its monarchs are well known in history, Chandragupta and Aśoka. The former put an end to the triumphant march of the invading Greeks, and the latter brought almost the entire semi-continental peninsula under a single control. It was also the latter who became a convert to Buddhism and elevated it to be a state religion. Throughout his domain, caves were opened for assembly, and stone monuments and pillars were erected with inscriptions of the teaching. He also sent Buddhism on the way to developing into the first world religion. While one of his royal princes took the teaching overseas to Ceylon, a great many missionaries were despatched overland. The story of these triumphant overseas and transcontinental advances of Buddhism, meeting on their way diverse cultures of West and East, remains one of the most stimulating chapters in the history of cultural contacts. Thus, these two branches of Buddhism, known as the Southern transmission and the Northern transmission, parted company only to have a reunion in China, and to make that empire the second radiating center of Buddhism in the Far East.

Wherever it went Buddhism prospered. But at home in India, with the decline of the Maurya dynasty soon after the death of King Aśoka, Buddhism showed signs of retrogression. The long dismal story of stress and strain, with fast changing political fortunes that intervened, will not be told here. Out of the chaos and confusion due to internal disruptions and foreign invasions, there emerged in the name of Hinduism a new system of religious control. This was an attempt to unify all surviving native cults in the face of alien aggression. And soon enough, militant Islam forced its way into the land of Buddha. Hinduism was eager to swallow anything indigenous to make its united front stronger, while Islam was ruthless in its devastating iconoclasm. Pressed by these two forces, internal and external, Buddhism lost even its physical identity in its homeland. Since the twelfth century the oldest world religion has been without its Zion, its Mecca, its Holy Land.

By the dawn of the Christian era Buddhism had arrived in China and grew steadily in strength during the period when China was divided into the Three Kingdoms (220-265) and the Six Dynasties (265-590). At that time Buddhism was known as the teaching of the Three Treasures: Buddha, the object of worship; Dharma, the law he

taught, which was now contained in scriptures; and Sangha, the order consisting of volunteers dedicated to the promotion of the teaching. It had in its possession a singular system of logic known as the dialectics of negation, a well organized psychology of religion, and a metaphysics of beatitude. And in the temperate zone of the Middle Kingdom, the arts—architecture, sculpture, and painting—helped to develop tangible, visible centers in a magnificent style. Not only in the capital were there a large number of great religious compounds with their seven standard buildings, including many storied pagodas, but also on the scenic hillsides and waterfronts, such historic centers as T'ien-t'ai, Wu-t'ai, and O-mei were opened, at times with over ten thousand inhabitants. The unified China under Empress Dowager Wu (684-709) was the witness of Buddhism at its apogee of glory, when it proved itself the most powerful in the triangular competition with Taoism and Confucianism. By that time China was the radiating center of Buddhism of the entire continent. Korea and Japan, Tibet and Mongolia, were brought under the sway of Buddhism.

But prosperity was an incentive to persecution. The history of Chinese Buddhism mentions governmental persecution enacted against Buddhism under four different dynasties, the one which took place during the ninth century being the worst. All decorations of the monasteries, gold, silver, and bronze, were removed and confiscated, and more than a million monks and nuns were compelled to give up their order. This marked the beginning of a steady decline of Buddhism.

Even so, Buddhism was able to retain its influence during the Sung dynasty (960-1279) by developing a more rigid form known as Zen and, during the Yüan dynasty (1260-1368), by introducing a more esoteric form of Buddhism called Lamaism with its headquarters in Tibet. But the official form of instruction adopted and promulgated by the Chinese government under succeeding dynasties was Neo-Confucianism, which included in itself elements of indigenous and historic teachings together with those of Buddhism—in significance, something akin to Vedānta in Hinduism. This forestalled Buddhism's chance of becoming the national faith. During the Ming (1368-1644) and the Ch'ing (1644-1912), Buddhism kept its bare existence through syncretism or rapprochement with popular forms of Taoism. At the end of the Ch'ing dynasty came Nationalist China (1912-), fast fol-

lowed by the Communist regime. We all know where Communism stands with regard to religion.

With the loss of India and China, Buddhism no longer possessed the mien of a world religion. It still held in its fold three distinct geographical areas in Asia: Ceylon and the southeast seacoast countries in the tropical zone, the table land of Tibet in the frigid altitude, and in a milder climate the Japanese archipelagoes. But all those countries in the tropical and frigid zones had long been under alien domination, and Japan, the only country who had stood on her own feet, made a complete surrender in the recent World War. So there is not much to wonder at if I say that the case of Buddhism as a world religion was precarious, if not hopeless.

After the war, news began to arrive that Asia was astir. With the consent of the British government, India had regained her independence and sovereignty. So had most of the Southeast Asian countries. Ceylon also followed suit, but with certain limitations. Tibet may enjoy the same benefit from China. The colonial days of Asia are over.

Then one day at Columbia University, I was told that Premier Nehru of the new Indian government was to be awarded an honorary degree, and that on this occasion he would give an address on the foreign policy of his government. I did not go to the convocation ceremony, but it so happened that when I turned on the radio at home, Nehru was speaking. I was instantly captivated and listened with keen interest, not because of the political importance of his speech but because of the form in which he expounded his cause. He said that the Indian government would abide by the policy of non-alignment with major powers and non-neutrality between conflicting powers. Non-domination and non-discrimination were to be India's unswerving position. Non-indifference to economic evils and non-violence even when the end justifies the means. Also, non-preparedness in defense and no fear of external aggression. Eight points were made—all in negative terms. Not being a student of politics, I am in no position to make any comment in regard to the international significance of his address. What really attracted my attention was the negative expressions he used. In this respect, Premier Nehru's eight points resemble the dialectics of negation of Nāgārjuna, famous Indian Buddhist of the second century. Nāgārjuna has often been called the St. Paul of Bud-

dhism, because of his tremendous contribution to the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The eight Mahāyāna sects look up to him as their first master. The essay in which he expounds his logic of negation is called Mādhyamika, or the Middle, and for Buddhists the middle means truth, reality.

This St. Paul of Buddhism avers that real truth can be reached only through eightfold negations, and he deals with eight conflicting types of thought which were then much in vogue in his country. He starts with monism and pluralism and asks, is reality one or many? And he negates both. Then he takes up vitalism and materialism and asks, is reality alive or dead? And he again negates both. The third issue is eternalism and momentalism, and he asks, is reality eternal or momentary? Again he negates both. The last question he asks is, is reality a thing of the past or a thing of the future? And once again he negates both. He says in conclusion that the true sense of reality is, can be, and will be reached through these eight negations. I am not sure whether you will agree with Nāgārjuna's dialectics, but it might be fun to test it on a much simpler question, such as the whereabouts of the middle. Let us ask eight questions. Is the middle in the front or in the rear? Is the middle to the right or to the left? Is the middle above or below? Is the middle horizontal or vertical? If we were to answer all of these questions in the negative, it would appear that the true middle is reached. According to Nāgārjuna, it was through this kind of persistent negation that Buddha himself reached the light which is the middle of all. Paradoxically, negation results in affirmation. My purpose, however, is not to sell this dialectics of negation, but to indicate that a way of thinking seldom dies. Nāgārjuna's way of thinking continues to live in Premier Nehru's way of stating the new government policy, and so Buddhism, I thought, still lingers in its native land. Before the foregone conclusion that Buddhism was entirely lost in India, this unexpected coincidence appeared like a beam of revelation.

Last year I took a flying trip around the world and stopped for a couple of weeks in India, as I was eager to see with my own eyes whether or not Buddhism was still alive. The first thing I wanted to do was to meet an Indian scholar of established authority having Hinduist affinity, so that I might get an inkling of the Hinduist attitude toward Buddhism. It was my good fortune to meet a very learned

scholar, high in the council of the new government, who happened to be an honorary alumnus of Columbia University. What a pleasant surprise it was, then, when, in an interview with this scholar, I was told of the recent government decision to open all sacred historical sites of Buddha in North India for the pilgrimage of Buddhists the world over, thus commemorating the 2500th anniversary of Buddha's Enlightenment. So upon the new government's initiative, India will again be Buddha's homeland, and the sacred sites, though sadly dilapidated, will be restored as a mecca for all Buddhists. This may be the beginning of great things to come. A center of real unity for world Buddhists may come into tangible and visible existence by this official decision of the government.

During my short stay in New Delhi, I received another bit of interesting news. An Indian leader whom I was very much interested to meet was former Attorney General B. R. Ambedkar, who had just left for Bombay to give personal guidance to a newly launched movement of emancipating the "untouchables." He would lead this movement, I learned, in accordance with Buddha's avowed principle of human equality. For the student of Buddhism this conception of human equality is a very refreshing topic, but time will not allow discussion of it here. I thought it encouraging that this new movement of emancipation is being inaugurated in the name of Buddha. And, in a recent communication from New Delhi in the *New York Times* (October 16, 1956), we learn that about 200,000 untouchables, led by Dr. Ambedkar and his wife, accepted Buddhism in a mass conversion ceremony at Nagpur. This is another indication that Buddhism is still very much alive in its native land.

I also learned, during my stay in India, that Ceylon, traditional stronghold of Buddhism, would sponsor the commemoration of Buddha's 2500th anniversary, by inviting representatives from all Buddhist countries and, at the same time, undertake the compilation of an encyclopedia of Buddhism in English for the common use of all who are interested in Buddhism. The plan is to request outstanding Buddhist experts of other countries to contribute, so that the best information from all Buddhist authorities will be made available. One serious disadvantage in Buddhism is, not the lack or scarcity of Buddhist literature, but the absence of a book for the common use of all Buddhists. An encyclopedia, of course, is not a Bible or a Qur'ān, but

it will serve as a common reference, and it augurs well that this reference book will be compiled through international co-operation of Buddhists of all countries. This may prove to be another case of the beginning of a great thing in history.

I received in Rangoon still another bit of news. The State University of Burma was going to institute an advanced study of Buddhism, inviting Japanese Buddhists to inaugurate it. According to a young professor of philosophy whose acquaintance I had made at Columbia a few years ago, the project is for developing mutual understanding through the joint study of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism. We all know that the Third International Buddhist Conference was held there last year with the new government of Burma acting as host.

The latest news which I should like to report in this connection is that the picturesque and historical kingdom of Nepal is going to hold the Fourth International Buddhist Conference this fall, and the government, by donating a large area of land with a variety of installations, is carrying out a restoration of the birthplace of Buddha, where Aśoka's pillar still stands. You may well recall that it was in this newly independent country at the foot of the Himalayas that Mahāyāna sutras, thought to have been lost, were discovered in great number.

In Japan, I stayed long enough to visit important Buddhist centers and to renew my acquaintance with scholars of all sects and denominations. My general impression was that the war had left its mark, and that materially Buddhism is not what it once was. Still, it is possible to count thirteen Buddhist universities of regular standard. One distinctive feature is that, in a number of these universities, library collections are excellent. The libraries of Mt. Koya, Ryukoku, and Otani Universities are repositories, not only of Japanese works but of Chinese, Korean, and Mongolian as well, and lately there have been added source materials in Tibetan, Pali, and Sanskrit. A great number of the manuscripts in their custody are treasures of the nation, if not of the world at large. Academic tools, including dictionaries, encyclopedias, reference works, tables, and maps, are available. And, in the matter of linguistics, thanks to the pioneering of such scholars as Nanjo, Takakusu, and Watanabe, and the ceaseless effort of the intervening half-century, Japanese Buddhism can now rely on first-rate scholars for guidance in the departments of Hindu and Buddhist

studies in almost every advanced institution. A few years ago these scholars organized themselves into a society known as the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, with an ever-increasing membership drawn from all universities and denominations. Dr. S. Miyamoto, Professor Emeritus of Indian studies at Tokyo University, who has studied at Oxford, is Chairman of its Board of Directors, and Dr. H. Nakamura, Professor of Indian philosophy at Tokyo University, its Executive Secretary. Dr. M. Nagai, Professor of Pali and Sanskrit at Tokyo University, Dr. E. Kanakura, Professor of Sanskrit at Tohoku University, Dr. S. Yamaguchi, Professor of Tibetan and President of Otani University, Dr. G. Nakano, President of Mt. Koya University, who has translated the Code of Manu, are all serving as directors. The *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies,* a semi-annual publication of high academic standard which contains English summaries, is in its fourth year. I was told that these scholars are eager and ready to join in making international co-operation a success.

The restoration and opening of holy sites in Buddha's native land, the compilation of an encyclopedia of Buddhism in English through international co-operation, and annual and regular conferences of Buddhists from all countries, are happy innovations which may help bring new life. I would like to see, in this international contact and co-operation, invitations extended to Buddhist scholars in Europe as well as in this country, so as to make it not just an Asian affair but one that is truly international in scope. Oxford and Cambridge Universities are outstanding centers for Indian and Buddhist studies. So are the Sorbonne and the Musée Guimet in France. Leyden University in Holland, and Berlin and Leipzig Universities in Germany have shown the way of scientific approach to the subject, and this scientific approach is essential in fructifying real contacts on an international scale. Another fortunate development in this connection is that the center of Oriental studies in the West is moving to this country. I have noticed that a great number of European scholars are coming here to stay, and, if I am not greatly mistaken, the new generation of scholars is showing sufficient interest in the study of Buddhism to promise great days to come. When international co-operation is in full swing, many interesting things will result. But at the same time, tremendous difficulties lie ahead.

A thing which I would like to see is the compilation of a compre-

hensive and exhaustive collection and publication of biographical materials of the founder, now scattered in different geographic areas, and supplemented by more recent discoveries in anthropology, archeology, and linguistics, as well as other scientific research. As far as I can see, the life story of Buddha did not take coherent form until the appearance of Aśvagoṣa's *Buddhacarita*. Written in the exotic atmosphere of Kanishka's kingdom over five hundred years after Buddha's death, this biography was literary rather than historical. Probably for the sake of popular appeal, the son of Śākya was represented as being a prince, and his awareness of human suffering and his renunciation of worldly ties and privileges were represented with highly dramatic pathos and in a pessimistic strain. Even at the moment of supreme attainment Gautama was made to appear like a wonderstricken mystic, instead of as the light that enlightens others.

If I am not greatly mistaken, the life story of Buddha is a story of triumph and not of defeat. The stark pessimism and devaluation of existence which enshrouds Buddha's life story, as usually told, need a critical review. His teaching is often represented as the transition from perennial human suffering to total extinction of life. I am quite willing to leave the issue to further study, but it seems to miss the mark to think that this teaching is one of barren negation. Buddha's negation was, rather, a way to reach the middle—the dynamic center of relativity—the harmony, always susceptible and sensitive to everything that goes on around it.

I find some astonishing, though entirely accidental, parallels between Buddha's story of attainment of the light and the history of the achievement of American independence. Here, only three points will be mentioned. Buddha's religious career starts with the renunciation of his home life and worldly ties in order to begin a new life. Does not American history also start with the story of the forefathers taking leave of home and country in order to seek freedom in the new continent? The second chapter of Buddha's life is a period of trials and tests in the wilderness in search of a new light. He sat on a rock to meditate, slept under trees for revelations, and like a stoic he fought temptations, like a martyr defied death. Did not American forefathers as pioneers likewise risk life and defy death in their push from frontier to frontier to lay the foundation of a new nation? Thirdly, Buddha had to refute and overcome all old and existing heritages and tradi-

tions before he attained enlightenment. This is where Nāgārjuna derived inspiration for his dialectics of negation. Again, did not American forefathers combat and reject all old ways, Spanish, Dutch, French and even English, before they reached their new concept of government? To me these parallelisms are as convincing as they are remarkable.

Furthermore, in Buddha's enlightenment there are three distinct features which have come to be known as the *Trāya Mudrās* of Buddhism. The first is the tenet of evolution: *Anitya sarva saṁskāra,* or everything is non-eternal, subject to change. Does not the American Declaration of Independence mention the inevitability of change of government in the course of human affairs? Also, does not the Constitution already have over twenty amendments? The second tenet of Buddhism is that of non-absolutism: *Nirātmān sarva dharmā,* which means all laws should be non-absolute, non-arbitrary. The Constitution of this country is a monument erected in refutation of the absolute rule of king and parliament. Both Republicans and Democrats stand in constant vigilance against absolutism in any form. In a third and last tenet, Buddhism gives peace as its ultimate end: *Śāntaṃ nirvāṇam* means the end is peacefulness. It is harmony or *Mādhyamika,* the mediation of all relations. And, in the American Constitution, the government is established to safeguard peace with an authority derived from the consent of the governed. The decision of Congress always points to the mediation of all interests. Is it a mere coincidence that the American course of continental expansion seems generally to have followed the middle way along the temperate zone?

I will not argue further in terms of parallelism, but I feel that the underlying identity as shown in these striking parallels warrants a new interpretation of Buddha's life. Stark pessimism must give way to enlightened optimism. Buddha was the light, and the light was Buddha. The light stood for change; it also stood for amendment, but the light was always there to illumine the way to harmony which is peace.

After the light was attained, Buddha proceeded to enlighten others. The outcome of this was the creation of a fraternity known as the Sangha, meaning a union of harmony. As has already been pointed out, the Sangha was a fraternity consisting of volunteers pledged to bear the torch of the light. The rules and regulations adopted by con-

sent of the fraternity are all preserved in the Vinaya section of the Tripitaka. In the order, there were three basic requirements. The first was the observance of *Śīla,* the rule regulating personal deportment. The second was *Dhyāna,* or self-experience and self-experiment which is the foundation of all religious life. And the third was *Prajnāparamita* or education, the study of Buddha's teaching for the development of intelligence. Later three more requirements were added. The first was *Dāna,* or willingness to share the light. The second was *Kṣānti,* or forbearance. And the third was *Vīrya,* or perseverance. Having taught for more than forty years, Buddha passed away at the age of eighty-one. *Śantaṃ nirvānaṃ.* It was a most peaceful ending.

The remark has often been made that Buddha's response varied as that of a "a great bell; the harder the stroke, the deeper the sound." Buddhism is defined as the way of extinguishing the accumulation of suffering. What is the way of extinguishing human suffering? Traditionally, eight right ways are mentioned: right views, right ideas, right speech, right action, right occupation, right perseverance, right attention, and right experiment. What is "right" then? "Right" is right when one is aware of the cause and the condition of things and acts accordingly. Cause and condition compose what Buddhists call the nexus of relativity. Our cosmos is like the water of an ocean where every drop of water is relative, never in isolation. To be aware of *Hetupratyaya* or relativity is the crux of Buddha's teaching. Awareness is not stereotyped; it is a growing thing. The fuller the awareness of relativity, the better.

Because of the evolutionary, non-final, and relativistic character of the teaching, it was only logical to expect that new departures and deviations would take place among the followers, as indeed they did. Buddhism as we have it now, therefore, is not just the teaching of *Bodhi* by Buddha, himself, but also the teaching about *Bodhi* and Buddha by his followers. Buddhism is not the work of a single individual but of many; it was not made once for all but has always been in the making. In its long history eight occasions call for special attention. The first occasion occurred right after Buddha's death. The question arose as to who were more worthy of carrying on his mission, the ranking students of the Sangha, or those who were sent forth to spread the teaching? This controversy is known as that of *Theravāda* (the Way of the Elders) against *Mahāsāṅghika* (the Great Assembly). A sec-

ond occasion took place during the reign of King Aśoka, when a great assembly met for the purpose of collecting Buddha's sayings. A schism now occurred in regard to a difference in emphasis between dual aspects of the doctrine, positive and negative. The positive emphasis would gravitate toward a stress on noumenon, or the thing which is permanent, while the negative emphasis would dwell on phenomenon, or the thing which is in ceaseless flux. This is called the division of *Sarvāstivādin* and *Sautrāntika.* The third occasion which caused a division of camps came into prominence in the kingdom of Kusha. The point was whether the light was meant for self-perfection or for the salvation of others. Was it a matter of intelligence or a matter essentially of faith? Was it for the few or for the many? This is the well-known division between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism which spread over all the Buddha lands. The fourth controversy was also long drawn out, and extended from India to China. In the teaching of the light which is the more important, the logic of negation or the psychology of Buddahood? The former is called *Sūnyatā* and the latter *Vijñapti mantra siddhi.* Such great names as Nāgārjuna (ca. 100-206) and Vasubandhu (ca. 420-500) in India, and Kumārajiva (344-413) and Hsüan-tsang (596-664) in China are connected with this discussion.

The culmination was development of two scholastic systems, one known as the T'ien-t'ai school, with the *Lotus Sūtra* as its scripture, and the other as the Hua-yen school, with the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* as its testament. The former represents the idealistic trend, while the latter is realistic. A fifth occasion came when the scholastic Buddhism of the Northern transmission had a reunion in China with that of the Southern transmission, which had already arrived there. The contrast was remarkable—the one all-embracing and all-inclusive, while the other was a sort of homeless mendicant, still remaining true to the original and emphasizing a regulated life and personal experiment. The latter was Ch'an, or Zen, Buddhism. Then a sixth occasion occurred, first in India, then in China, and later in Japan. The question was where is the source of the light? In man or in nature? This brought the division of Exoteric and Esoteric Buddhism. With the emergence of Esoteric Buddhism, the Buddha in history, Śākyamuni, gives over the center of the pantheon to the Buddha in the macrocosm, Vairocana. Then too, in Japan, during the middle ages when warfare was the order of the day, otherworldliness began to play an important part in religion.

The light is to be found only in the life hereafter, where the Buddha of love awaits everyone of us in a paradise open to all. This development in Japan is known as the departure of Jodo-mon from Shodo-mon. The former is the school which teaches rebirth in paradise, while the latter avers as its aim the attainment of Buddhahood in this life. An eighth and last division is in regard to rebirth in paradise. Is it through one's own work or by the mercy of the Buddha of love? Apparently all such controversies and departures were signs of energy and vigor on the part of Buddhism, for Buddhism was thus growing larger in scope and wider in influence. But when controversy ceased, Buddhism itself also became immobile.

In the course of this making and remaking of Buddhism in various lands at varying times, there emerged three central objects of worship, the Buddha of history, the Buddha of nature, and the Buddha of the life hereafter. They are called Śākyamuni, Vairocana, and Amitābha, respectively. It is interesting to note that in the three widely separated areas of Asia where Buddhism still survives, the center of worship is occupied by Śākyamuni in the tropical areas of Ceylon, Burma, and other Southeast Asian lands, Vairocana in the frigid plateau of Tibet, and Amitābha in the temperate islands of Japan. Roughly put, in the tropical area Buddhism has continued to be the established church, with the Buddha of history as the center of worship. Hīnayāna Buddhism, as this is called, is conservative, orthodox, and ethical in character, and its pantheon, despite luxuriant nomenclature, retains the dignity of original purity and restraint. Geographically in isolation, Tibetan Buddhism is almost unique. It is known as Lamaism, and the Dalai Lama, the supreme manifestation of Buddha on earth, is at the head of both church and state. But the Buddha in the center of the pantheon is not the Buddha of history but the Buddha of the cosmos. Rather than the human excellences of intuition and virtue, the primeval forces of creation and fertility appear to be its main preoccupation. Superhuman acts take the form of abnormality. It is esoteric, and its pantheon is replete with icons and images displaying power, magical and demoniacal. Japanese Buddhism, the last extension of Buddhism's eastward progress, is the repository of all the developments which took place during the protracted transcontinental and overseas march. As a result its pantheons are rich in variety, but the most popular is the one that enshrines the Buddha of the life here-

after. He is the Buddha of compassion who awaits the arrival of the devout in a paradise of his creation. Neither ascetic, as in Hīnayāna Buddhism, nor demoniacal, as in Esoteric Buddhism, this Buddha sits or stands in the pantheon with hands in open welcome. Thus Buddhism differs as does the climate, but in the long vista, there can scarcely be any doubt that these three Buddhas belong to the same family.

The attempt to bring the three Buddhas into a unity has already been made in more than one way. *Suvarṇaprabhasottomarāja Sūtra* is an instance. As the title of this sutra indicates, the three different forms of Buddhas are explained as three different aspects of one and the same Buddha. Just as the title reads, gold, light, and illumination, these three are inseparable. Where there is gold there is light, and where there is light there is illumination. So it is with the three forms of Buddha. Where there is the Buddha of the cosmos, there is the Buddha of the life hereafter, and where there is the Buddha of the life hereafter there is the Buddha of history.

The Shingon doctrine is also quite explicit in emphasizing the underlying identity of the three forms of Buddhas, Dharma-kāya (body of law), Sambhoga-kāya (body of bliss), and Nirmāna-kāya (body of activity). But in its iconography it goes a step further. Take the instance of the Garbha Mandala, one of two iconographic presentations of the doctrine. It brings five Buddhas into one pantheon, calling it one in many and many in one. Vairocana occupies the center and represents the cosmic Buddha. He is surrounded by Buddha the Healer, Akṣobhya, on his left (East); Buddha the Egalitarian, Ratnasambhava, below (South); Buddha the Savior, Amitābha, to his right (West); and Buddha the Realizer, Śākyamuni, above (North). Unity in variety and variety in unity, or one in many and many in one—this is the confirmed doctrine of Buddhism. And so, in future international conferences of Buddhists, the existing differences should again be brought forth for deeper awareness of the underlying oneness.

WHAT CAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION ACCOMPLISH? *

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IN ONE OF HIS EARLY ESSAYS (1873), Nietzsche dealt severely with David Friederich Strauss, and particularly with his book on *The Old and the New Faith.*[1] Nietzsche found solid meaning in authentic religious faiths, and he admired the contributions of perceptive scholarship to a critical understanding of them. But a multiplication of commonplace opinions and observations on religion seemed to him symptomatic of philistine accommodation and a spreading indifferentism which he despised. Sören Kierkegaard, in his critique of Hegel's philosophical apologetic for Christianity, and in our day Karl Barth, have conceived religious faith, in its truest genuine character, to be beyond the competence of philosophical methods.

The points made by these several critics are far from identical, and behind each of them there is much distinctive special pleading. But the very different paths and interests of their respective arguments give convergent testimony to a truth which they grasp in common. In minimal terms this truth is that there enter into religious faith—in any case, into some highly significant religious faiths—components which are beyond the power of philosophy to supply, and some of which may even be antithetic to rational belief. Faith in the unique and indispensable saving power of a particular, individual person furnishes a major illustration; another would be faith in some concealed eschatological event. Faith in the justice of the world order could be another, perhaps more controversial though also more universal example.

But from these considerations the conclusion must not be drawn that philosophy generally and necessarily is in purely external relation to religious faith. We must not fail to consider the examples to the contrary furnished by many minds—Augustine and Spinoza in the West, Śańkara and Chuang-tse in Asia, to mention only a few out-

* Paper read at the American Philosophical Association meeting in Philadelphia, December 28, 1956.

1. F. Nietzsche, "David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer," in *Thoughts out of Season.*

standing ones. Philosophical reflection was surely intrinsic to what each of these men achieved as a characteristic and authentic religious awareness. Its illumination is as indispensable as mystical devotion and prayer in their total testimony to the ultimate. And what is most significant is not alone the role of philosophy in the initial genesis of these men's ideas, but its ongoing indispensable place in the several living traditions of religious thought that derive from them. Their search, their doctrines, and their influence would be inconceivable apart from an intimate fusion of philosophical and religious elements.

One inescapable problem that emerges from what has been said concerns the nature of authenticity in matters of religion. Is credit unlimited in this field? Or is it possible to say how it relates, for example, to truth-values, to tradition and convention, to motivation and other psychological conditions? Let us consider what philosophy of religion can do with this problem.

It is clear that no uniform attitude on this issue of authenticity exists among religious people and groups themselves. For many it is thoroughness or wholeness of personal commitment that is the chief mark of the genuinely religious. But another view attaches equal or greater importance to correct observance in accordance with historic canons of a trusted derivation. Still others would make recognition of some objective truth or truths the primary test of genuine religion. No doubt specific and particular combinations of these emphases are more prevalent than is pure adherence to one of them alone.

Now philosophy of religion should not be expected—certainly not in the present state of culture, if ever—to resolve these differences by producing a universally acceptable concept of authenticity in religion. But for the philosopher of religion to ignore actual religious practices and beliefs, and to indulge in detached speculation, is likely to prove sterile and inconsequential. Participation (if only as a critic) is in religion what possession is in the law. Effectual philosophy of religion, therefore, usually attaches itself to selected forms of religion, in either an interpretative or a critical role. Indeed, there is no reason and little chance for the philosopher of religion to be aloof from or neutral in religious controversy as to the marks and meanings of authenticity.

But since as a philosopher he is not to be a hireling, he must engage in the human and cultural situation with discernment of his own. He will differ from other participants by some distinctive cast of his

curiosity and reflection, and in a situation such as obtains in our world today, he has unusual explorative opportunities. He has more resources than were ever to hand before with which to examine the "varieties," not only of "religious experience," but of religion in every aspect of its social and personal relations. By developing this opportunity he can extend understanding of different kinds of authentic religion, and of the conditions that affect positively and negatively the genuineness of each. Such learned attainment in itself will scarcely qualify a philosopher of religion to be directly legislative for religious life. This role belongs in the main to priests, prophets, and to congregations rather than to scholars. But the context in which the more active agents work, and their awareness of its possibilities, can be extended, modified, and clarified by broad and probing scholarship.

Thus, Plutarch in his day probably did not supply the priests of Isis with criteria by his far-ranging and sagacious interpretations of their traditions and cult. But he brought the latter into a larger cross-cultural context and promoted meaningful comparison with other traditions in this more cosmopolitan context of the Hellenistic age. Similarly, in recent times, explorative men like William James and Max Weber may not have given exact clues which Calvinists are prepared to accept as the decisive truth about "regeneration," "election," and "perseverance." But again their psychological and sociological investigations and reflections have certainly extended, changed, and illumined the context in which the operation of these and cognate religious features can be significantly considered.

In sum, the examples (of Weber, James, and Plutarch among others) suggest a number of functions that philosophy of religion can helpfully serve. There is a challenging variety of significance to be observed in the world's religious life, inviting a strongly and searchingly explorative attention. Complex data of many kinds must be gathered and ordered in multiple ways to study religious phenomena with justly perceptive and fruitful comparison, and in the many connections required to detect their less obvious relations and bearings. Such inquiry brings liberation from the confines of any one official or conventional viewpoint. But it need not distort individual views; indeed, by comparison with others their distinctive features and values should be more sharply etched, and a fuller appraisal of their universalities should also be possible. In any case, such inquiry will raise fresh and

relevant questions about religious practices, meanings, and values in the variegated and changing life of men. These expansive functions, transcending provincial restrictions and stereotypes, are all within the competence of explorative philosophy of religion, if it avails itself intelligently of historical, social, and humanistic knowledge. This kind of liberation is something that it can and should accomplish.

Unfortunately, among the many in the United States today who are interested in philosophy of religion, too few are well prepared to engage thoroughly in productive explorations. The history of religions, the requisite languages and other essential inter-disciplinary studies, are too much neglected. Although improvement may be on the way, a rather thin and insipid product is at present all too common. But whatever the future brings in this respect, the question is bound to be raised whether the expansive, explorative studies above recommended are really the chief functions and responsibilities of philosophy of religion. Broad and varied appreciations, many-sided understandings are all well and good, but after all, religion raises questions of another dimension, such as call for ultimate choice, and wholeness of devotion and commitment. Can philosophy of religion contribute anything vital in respect to such questions? Granted that it can extend the description and interpretation of religious phenomena, developing a cumulative phenomenology of religion, ad infinitum, yet can it affect, or share in, life's religious assessments and decisions?

As a first step in reply, we must not allow breadth and depth of view to be represented as mutually exclusive. Must careful and extensive study of religious life flatten out into preoccupation with lesser features? Can its sophistication merely contemplate the consummate reaches of religion with shy embarrassment? It could be so. Yet let us, at least, credit the philosopher of religion with a human ability to recognize the nature of consummate religious values—e.g., states of blessedness able to prevail in the face of the world's evils, relations to greatness by which spiritual identity and sense of place in a universe are established, modes of communion that consecrate a belonging to society. But can philosophy of religion significantly help assess these consummate fruits of religion? Can its logical and functional analyses of behavioral, emotional, and doctrinal systems really bring more than a final perplexity confounding the wise, a wonder over the odd, ambiguous confusions in which such different things become mingled together? Perhaps, in some measure, it can.

Yet its assessing power is bounded by many clear limitations. No one can know all that the world-process has in store for anyone or any group, and the philosopher of religion can not, without injuring religious authenticity, be a proxy for anyone's "leap of faith." Neither can he predict so definitely where a leaper is going to land as to eliminate risk. At most he can enter a dialogue with people. And if he becomes sufficiently informed, he may be able to point out both individual and social relevances which can help some to take jumps more suited to their natures and circumstances than they otherwise might without the dialogue. In this way an explorative philosophy of religion may contribute, not only to secular, but even to religious knowledge conceived as a finding of one's spiritual bearings. The result, of course, will still remain a seeing in part.

The position here expressed is not without an implicit direction and some guiding convictions which should not be left unmentioned. The direction looks toward a hoped for growth of a greater community of individuals and peoples, prizing depth and range of personal development. There is not only hope but also belief that such growth of community is possible. There is a conviction that diversity of religious faith and consummation must be welcome within such community, and that complex issues of public order and enlightenment are entailed in this requirement. The vital significance of superstitions and the viable conditions of religious freedom are both matters of deep-running complication. That progress of scientific thought and invention can advance enlightenment in these difficult areas, and can provide conditions to liberate personal and spiritual growth, not merely technical and mass manipulations, is a further implicit conviction in the position here taken. It figures in the emphasis given to thoroughly explorative philosophy of religion.

Such philosophy can grant the function of dogmas in many, possibly in all religious systems, without abetting dogmatism as the dominant characteristic in its inclusive view of religion. Similarly, in the scientific study of religions, such explorative philosophy can admit reductive theories (e.g., religious behavior is regulation of life-crises, religious imagination projects psychological and social patterns, etc.) for whatever discovery of relations they can promote, without being predisposed to reductionist treatment of religious meaning in toto.

Timely challenges and tasks for philosophy of religion are presented by prevailing cultural conditions at large. Thus, Thomas Aquinas

built his adjustment of faith and reason upon a widely accepted heritage of classic philosophy and a single dominant system of religious dogma. Immanuel Kant constructed his adjustment on a system of sciences in which Newtonian physics and conceptions of moral law were central. The foundations underlying both the Thomistic and Kantian adjudications do not so well represent the cultural scene today. Thus also, David Hume's telling critique of once prominent types of rationalist theology still hits home if the target is there!

Despite all change, some lasting dimensions of inquiry can still be denominated in an old way: *Bonum, Verum, Esse.* What's good, makes true sense, with power to be? But in today's meeting of changing cultures the answers of tradition become obfuscated. Upheavals in society and ideas bring us into vast uncharted regions. Our little planet suddenly seems crowded, while the physical universe stretches away ever expanding in our view. The lure in being is as much there as ever, almost too exciting, so that our energies may break into compulsive furies, if dawning possibilities of greater greatness do not direct them into more creative channels. In the tumult of existence, life can go unlived, little understood, without great blessing. More than one counsel will surely be given in this situation, and more than one makes some sense. There is the counsel to hold fast the faith once delivered. And there is the counsel to emulate the Socratic integrity: to examine life in searching communication with others, and not to run away from responsibility. Wherever the emphasis may be placed, with respect to these and to still other counsels, it is clear that today the circles of faith and the circles of inquiry are both deeply challenged to extend their range and appreciation. Philosophy of religion, in fertile conjunction with other disciplines, could participate genuinely and significantly in this extension.

COMMENT BY PETER A. BERTOCCI *

It is very difficult for any author to compress into eight typed pages a well-rounded argument for a conception of philosophy of religion. It may well be, then, that Professor Friess has most of what is here to

* Paper read at the American Philosophical Association meeting in Philadelphia, December 28, 1956.

be suggested in mind. Indeed, in the "abstract" of his paper he states that he "does not attempt a complete answer to the question." But his paper does provide us with an opportunity to reconsider the task of philosophy of religion. I find myself agreeing with most of what he says, yet I think that the uniquely philosophic function threatens to disappear if what is said in his paper is even the main focus of philosophy of religion.

1. Professor Friess, at the outset, accepts as true the claim that "there enter into religious faith—in any case, into some highly significant religious faiths—components which are beyond the power of philosophy to supply, and some of which may even be antithetic to rational belief." In this statement there are actually two assertions which, as it seems to me, it is a primary function of the philosophy of religion to examine: (a) what it means to say that a component of religious faith is beyond the power of philosophy to supply, and (b) what it means to be antithetic to reason. The initial statement as a whole is itself a conclusion which needs support by a religious epistemology which has taken pains to examine whether, in what sense, and to what extent, experience purported to be religious is trustworthy.

It is true, of course, that philosophy can no more create the presumably non-logical, non-sensory data of religious experience than it can create the non-logical, sensory data of natural knowledge. But significant philosopher-theologians have had to ask even the question: What is it that constitutes data religious? Furthermore, should we conclude that there are unique religious data, there remains the philosophical task of evaluating the knowledge-claims made on the basis of, or concomitant with, such non-sensory experiences. This would call for relating the conclusions from such claims to the conclusions arrived at by philosophical evaluation of sensory data, and other possibly non-religious types of experience such as the moral and the aesthetic. Unfortunately, I may remark, the trend in most recent theological thought has neglected underlying epistemological questions, but what seems to be emerging is a new realization of the importance of the epistemological problem.

2. Professor Friess himself is concerned about the "nature of authenticity in matters of religion," and he asks whether credit is unlimited in this field. But after stating that "no uniform attitude on this issue of authenticity exists among religious people and groups

themselves," one would have expected him, perhaps, to ask whether this should not be the critical philosophical question. What does Professor Friess actually say? "Now philosophy of religion should not be expected—certainly not in the present state of culture, if ever—to resolve these differences by producing a universally acceptable concept of authenticity in religion."

If this statement means that any particular philosopher of religion who has wrestled with the problem of authenticity in religion, cannot expect universal agreement for a particular doctrine of authenticity, it is an acceptable statement of human limitation, deplore limitations as we may. But if it means that we should not expect the philosopher of religion to seek a universal test of religious truth, then it seems to me that the central function of philosophy of religion has been given up. Religious experience is one type of experience among other human experiences. The philosopher's function is to understand varying religious claims, seek to discover the basic arguments and conflicts among them, and then proceed to ask whether the claims made for basic agreements, or for uniqueness, can be substantiated, confirmed, modified, or rejected, in the light of the remainder of experience. The philosophical problem is neither to give religion priority, nor to disregard it by arbitrarily imposing criteria drawn from other areas of experience upon it. It is to seek for a careful hearing for all claims, religious and non-religious, in the light of all relevant evidence and considerations.

3. Professor Friess himself remarks that "there is no reason and little chance for the philosopher of religion to be aloof from, or neutral in, religious controversy as to the marks and meanings of authenticity." But then he goes on to urge that if the philosopher is not to be a "hireling, he must engage in the human and cultural situation with discernment of his own, nurtured in explorative studies of religion in every aspect of its social and personal relations." The philosopher's contribution, then, would be to "extend understanding of different kinds of authentic religions, and of the conditions that affect negatively and positively the genuineness of each."

Several reflections come to mind here.

A. What is meant by authentic religion is far from clear. By whose testimony does a religion become authentic? Is it still authentic if its religious, ethical, and metaphysical claims conflict with those of other

religions? Is the philosopher of religion, in other words, never to say that the religion of Islam, for example, does not give as adequate an account of human experience and knowledge as a whole as, say, Hinduism or Christianity? A philosophy of religion, it seems to me, raises the same philosophical question for the claims of religion as it does for the relevant claims of the specific sciences: Can this claim be upheld, once it is systematically criticized and evaluated in the light of all available knowledge and experience? The enemy of the philosophical venture, as I see it, is any arbitrary claim for logical or evidential priority from any part of experience.

B. Of course the philosopher of religion begins as a human being within a certain cultural situation, with psychological orientations and commitments of which he may not be fully aware. This is his human predicament, whether he faces the data of science or of religion. The problem he faces philosophically in his own life is to evaluate his presuppositions, his orientations, his commitments, by all he can bring to bear from his own total experience and that of all others. Any psychological commitment he has may still stand after he has criticized it as circumspectly as a philosopher should. But now his commitment is one he takes as a human being modified by his philosophical voyage of investigation. "The distinctive cast" of the philosopher forces him, not simply to explore other "authenticities" further, but to raise the question: On what grounds can religious authenticity be justified, if at all, when it conflicts with authenticities, not only with other claimed authenticities in the area of religion, but with the authenticities claimed by others in the fields of moral, aesthetic, logical, and scientific investigation? Thus, the fundamental task in the philosophy of religion is to seek an answer to the question: What are the truth-values of religious claims in the light of the "challenging variety of significance to be observed in the world's religious life?"

4. If I am correct, so far as one can tell from his paper, Professor Friess seems to limit the task of the philosophy of religion to the important, but still less than fully philosophic, task of comparison of religious phenomena with a view to discovering universalities without neglect of individuality. The task of such "explorative philosophy of religion," he says, is to "liberate us from provincialisms and stereotypes." While it seems to me that this is a very important phase of the work of the philosopher of religion, and that many of us need to take

seriously Professor Friess's plea for better preparation in this respect, the development of a "cumulative phenomenology of religion" can hardly fulfill the functions of philosophy of religion.

Professor Friess himself goes on to ask whether explorative description and interpretation of religious phenomena can "affect, or share in, life's religious assessments and decisions." To rephrase his answer briefly: An explorative philosopher of religion can enter into a dialogue with the people of any religious communion, and while he can never be "proxy for anyone's" risk in the "leap of faith," he "may point out both individual and social relevancies which can help some to take jumps more suited to their natures and circumstances than they otherwise might without the dialogue." Here again, however, while one cannot but approve the purpose of helping persons to find their "spiritual bearings," we must ask whether the more fundamental task of philosophy of religion must not involve more than increasing one's understanding of one's own and others' spiritual bearings. The real philosopher's task begins when he evaluates the truth of these bearings, and especially when conflicts are discovered either within the realm of religious phenomena or in assessing the relations of religious to non-religious bearings.

Again, as persons we must applaud Professor Friess' concern for a "greater community of individuals and peoples, prizing depths and range of personal development" which must indeed "include diversity of religious consummation." Furthermore, no adequately experiential philosophy of religion can philosophically afford to limit itself to the data and claims of any one religious perspective. But neither the religious venture nor the philosophic will gain without the most stringent inquiry into the grounds for religious belief, the evaluation of the cognitive, aesthetic, and moral values of religious experience, and the appraisal of the relation of God to man and the world. As the philosopher of religion confronts the variety and conflict of religious claims on each of these and similar questions, as he considers relevant data from the sciences, from non-religious analyses of the moral and aesthetic life, can he possibly be satisfied as philosopher, simply to clarify similarities and differences? Must he not accept the responsibility for seeing that claims made solely in the name of religious experience, or of moral experience, or of scientific, logical, or aesthetic experience, be not allowed arbitrarily to dictate what is true about

the existence and nature of God and his relation to the world and man?

Finally, the philosopher of religion can never be complacent, for he knows how complex his specific religious data are, and he knows that he must bring to bear upon his task as much wisdom as possible gained from his ventures into the other areas of philosophical investigation. In the last analysis, the philosophy of religion is a branch of man's concern to understand his world as a whole, and, as a branch, it cannot live without relation to the tree. At the same time, the tree of knowledge will never grow into wisdom if it neglects whatever insights may be garnered from those experiences of man in which he feels himself to be bound to the inner structure of reality and value.

BELLAMY'S RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION FOR SOCIAL REFORM: A REVIEW ARTICLE *

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IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY CLEAR, as more and more studies of nineteenth century American thought appear, that one of the dominant motivations of the thought of the age was romanticism. Most notable and best known is the romanticism of the New England Transcendentalists, who borrowed, chiefly at second hand, from the early German romantic movement. There are, in addition, a large number of other American movements of the age that suggest to the student that the emergence of the romantic temper in Transcendentalism was not as idiosyncratic as its protagonists would have liked to believe.[1] In discussing the religious motivations for social reform, we are concerned with two of these many forms: one political, largely entered into under the spell of Hegel and other organicist political theorists, especially Bluntschli and Stahl; and a religious form, related to, and in many instances directly descended from earlier millennial movements in Christian thought. The fusion of these two forms of romanticism, on a more or less Christian base, is characteristic of much of the late nineteenth century American literature of social reform; without an understanding of this literature it is impossible really to appreciate the Social Gospel movement in American theology.

The organicist influence manifests itself in the literature of reform by a sharp rejection of the traditional "liberal" idea of the limited state whose powers are strictly curtailed, and the substitution of the realization that the state is, as Gronlund put it, "the organic union of us all . . . to subdue nature, to redress natural defects and in-

* Joseph Schiffman, ed., *Edward Bellamy: Selected Writings on Religion and Society*. (The American Heritage Series, No. 11.) New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1955. xlix, 139 pp. Cloth $2.00. Paper 75¢.

1. Cf. Herbert W. Schneider, "A Century of Romantic Imagination in America," *The Philosophical Review*, LVI (1947), 351-56.

equalities." [2] In a word, the idea of a "welfare state" was formulated by late nineteenth century American social reformers. Although, as Ward pointed out, academic writers were still pressing the laissez-faire, Jeffersonian view that "that government is best which governs least," [3] and, although this view still satisfied those who were satisfied with the status quo, there was an increasing chorus of quite widely read (though now forgotten) writers who spoke for the dissatisfied and looked to the state for remedy.

Many of these spokesmen for the downtrodden and disinherited, although nominally Christians, had, to all intents and purposes, withdrawn themselves from Christian fellowship. The churches had become too respectable, too much defenders of things as they were, to please these ardent souls, and the alternative Christianity of the revivalistic sects was far too individualistic to satisfy their need for a faith that would make a difference in society. Moreover, many of them had been led by a sympathy with the thought of Auguste Comte, either directly or as mediated through Comte's American disciples, to substitute a religion of humanity, on the Comteian model, for the traditional other-worldly religion in which they had been reared. Thus Gronlund, showing here a similarity to the elder Henry James as well as to Comte, said that "The religion of the future will make holiness consist in indentifying ourselves with humanity—the redeemed form of man—as the lover merges himself in the beloved," and added, "The vicious part of Christianity is this, that it nourishes a sneaking private, personal hope on God's bounty." [4] Though, as is evident in this, the manifestation of the religious concerns of the reformers tended to take a non-Christian, and sometimes an anti-Christian form, it was nonetheless a religious concern, and it was given literary expression in purple passages of apocalyptic that dot the works of many of the reformers. Henry George, for example, ends the text of his *Progress and Poverty* with a vision of the secular millenium to come through the adoption of his program:

> It is the Golden Age of which poets have sung and high-raised seers have told in metaphor! It is the glorious vision which has always haunted men

2. Laurence Gronlund, *The Co-operative Commonwealth: An Exposition of Socialism* (Boston, 1893), p. 82.

3. Lester Frank Ward, *Glimpses of the Cosmos* (New York, 1913-18), II, 352.

4. Gronlund, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

with gleams of fitful splendor. It is what he saw whose eyes at Patmos were closed in a trance. It is the culmination of Christianity—the City of God on earth, with its walls of jasper and its gates of pearl! It is the reign of the Prince of Peace! [5]

Thanks to the work of Arthur E. Morgan a few years ago [6] and, more recently, of Joseph Schiffman,[7] it has now become clear that Edward Bellamy, author of *Looking Backward, 2000-1887,* and leader of the popular Nationalist movement of his day—a day when those who were thinking along Bellamy's line used the terms "socialism" and "nationalism" interchangeably—exemplifies the combination of the two romanticisms. Bellamy's youthful essay on "The Religion of Solidarity" has close kinship with Emersonian Transcendentalism. Morgan explains the similarity by claiming for Bellamy "One of those rare original minds which have the skill and power to get outside the framework of our thinking and to view man and his setting as would a fresh mind from another sphere." [8] Bellamy himself gave a description of the fresh view he sought:

> We should seek to reverse the accustomed order and make the objective subjective and the subjective objective. That is, we should seek to view ourselves as from without instead of viewing all things as from ourselves as from within. Seek a home, a center, a more intimate ego in the universe of things without.[9]

On close examination, this is an inversion of the Emersonian position, though equally transcendental. Where Emerson tried to draw all things into the soul, and to give meaning to all in terms of the indwelling spirit in the human soul, Bellamy attempts to draw the inward soul of man out into the larger whole of the universal soul.

Once the inversion is recognized, the result is decidedly similar. "The Religion of Solidarity" is a more or less connected statement of the relation between man and the divine. It opens, as did Emerson's "Divinity School Address" of 1838, with a warmly appreciative de-

5. Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*. An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth; the Remedy (Modern Library ed.), p. 552.

6. Arthur E. Morgan, *The Philosophy of Edward Bellamy* (New York, 1945).

7. Schiffman, *op. cit.*

8. Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. v.

9. Quoted by Morgan, *ibid.*, from an unpublished paper by Bellamy.

scription of the beauties of nature; this is followed by the suggestion that human nature is part of nature:

> Thus continually does the spirit in man betray affinity with nature by vague and seemingly purposeless longings to attain a more perfect sympathy with it. So far as this universal and strongly marked instinct can be distinctly interpreted, it indicates in human nature some element common with external nature, toward which it is attracted, as with the attraction of a part toward a whole, and with a violence that oftentimes renders us painfully conscious of the rigorous confines of our individual organisms.[10]

Becoming aware of these limitations, the soul struggles to transcend the individual. Man becomes conscious of "a painful incongruity . . . between the soul, so easily contemporary with all time, . . . and his individuality weighted down to a little point of time." [11] In its transcendence of the individual, to which it is spatially and temporally bound, the soul asserts solidarity with all existence. The transition from finite limitation to solidarity is hinted in esthetic experience, and it is realized that any similar emotion or mood that carries men beyond their own personalities is a revelation of "the activity of the greater self." [12]

In moments of divided consciousness, the impersonal soul seems to stand aside from the activity of the individual, and to view the individual serenely and as if it were criticizing the individual from another plane. Bellamy reminds us of the suggestion of Thoreau, in *Walden,* that there are moments when we are, in a sane sense, beside ourselves.[13] To this Bellamy adds the evolutionary thought that this possibility of divided consciousness in man's psychical nature, this possibility of realizing his universal soul at the same time as he is exercising his particular individuality and thus developing a sense of "solidarity with the universe," [14] is a late development in the human soul. Just as nineteenth century culture has added the romantic appreciation of nature to man's potentialities, so other psychic faculties have come to recent fruition. Indeed, "if culture can add such a

10. Schiffman, *op. cit.,* p. 4.
11. *Ibid.,* p. 5.
12. *Ibid.,* p. 8.
13. H. D. Thoreau, *Walden; or Life in the Woods* (Boston, 1893), p. 211; Schiffman, *op. cit.,* p. 10.
14. Schiffman, *op. cit.,* p. 11.

province as this to human nature within a century, it is surely not visionary to count on a still more complete future development of the same group of subtle psychical faculties." [15]

The development of solidarity and the recognition of its beauty should not lead us to despise individuality, but to gain a clearer sense of the dignity of the individual as the "channel, the expression of the universal." [16] The two are interdependent, as are centripetal and centrifugal forces; it is their polar tension that holds us in balance. By a proper conception of the value of both individuality and solidarity, we can stimulate and conserve both unity and variety. For "Individualities may or may not match well—here is room for choice; but souls always match, for they are inhalations of one breath, tongues of one flame." [17] An overemphasis on solidarity at the expense of individuality would lead to the destruction of variety and differentiation, and the merging of all into an undifferentiated unity. An overemphasis on individuality at the expense of solidarity would lead to the destruction of the social universe, which would break apart on the rocks of individual self-interests. The balance suggested in "The Religion of Solidarity" is meant to provide a *via media,* "the only rational philosophy of the moral instincts." [18] Unselfishness may be the essence of morality but, if the individual is the ultimate unit, unselfishness is madness. But Bellamy redefines unselfishness as the sacrifice of the lesser self, the individuality, to the greater self, the solidarity. Thus redefined, unselfishness is the self-interest of the greater self, and neither mad nor immoral.

In terms of Bellamy's reformulation of the nature of the soul as a duality of personal and impersonal elements, he is able to reconsider the traditional Christian view that this life is to be regarded as preliminary to a future life of eternal bliss for the saved. Eternity and time come together; eternity is the "time" of the impersonal soul. "Time is not the vestibule of eternity, but a part of it. We are now living our immortal lives. The present life is its own perfect consummation." [19] Bellamy's kinship to the thought of the Transcendental-

15. *Ibid.,* p. 12.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.,* p. 21.
18. *Ibid.,* p. 22.
19. *Ibid.,* p. 25.

ists, and particularly to Herman Melville, is especially clear in this. Melville realized that there were two types of existence, timed and timeless, simultanously operative in our lives; he called these two "horological" and "chronometrical." Bellamy's terms that seem to express the same distinction are "telescopic" and "microscopic." The telescopic is a window opening on the infinite, the timeless, the "chronometrical." The microscopic opens on the infinitesimal, the individual, the temporal, the "horological." [20] Bellamy, even more than Melville, saw that practical life calls for a mixture of the two approaches: "More and more be it the end of our philosophy to make the larger life the true and central, the individual inferior and accidental." [21] But, although Melville sometimes speaks of the "chronometrical" as this-worldly madness, he too saw the need for combining the two approaches to morality:

> Let men be taught those Chronometricals and Horologicals, and while still retaining every common-sense incentive to whatever of virtue be practicable and desirable, and having these incentives strengthened, too, by the consciousness of powers to attain their mark; then there would be an end to that fatal despair of becoming at all good, which has too often proved the vice-producing result in many minds of the undiluted chronometrical doctrines hitherto taught to mankind.[22]

The religion of solidarity whose outlines have been sketched lies at the foundation of the discussions of social reform, the tracts in the form of novels, that have established Bellamy's reputation. His "socialist nationalism" is the secular form of the religion of solidarity. Of the two major novels, *Equality* (1897) was the more fully elaborated statement of his position and betrays the relation of his social thought to the interpretation of the Declaration of Independence, which he characterized as the true constitution of the United States.

> The corner-stone of our state is economic equality, and is not that the obvious, necessary, and only adequate pledge of these three rights,—life, liberty, and happiness? What is life without its material basis, and what is an equal right to life but a right to an equal material basis for it? What is liberty? How can men be free who must ask the right to labor and to live from their fellow-men and seek their bread from the hands of others? How else can any government guarantee liberty to men save by providing them

20. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
22. Herman Melville, *Pierre* (New York, 1855), p. 292.

a means of labor and of life coupled with independence; and how could that be done unless the government conducted the economic system upon which employment and maintenance depend? Finally, what is implied in the equal right of all to the pursuit of happiness? What form of happiness, so far as it depends at all upon material facts, is not bound up with economic conditions; and how shall an equal opportunity for the pursuit of happiness be guaranteed to all save by a guarantee of economic equality? [23]

The questions posed here rhetorically were those that his writing and his activity on behalf of the Nationalist clubs answered; socialism, nationalism, and solidarity were the economic, political, and religious aspects of the answer. Bellamy could not agree that human nature was a constant; rather he took the materialistic view that human nature was a function of external conditions and, particularly, of the organizations of society. In *Looking Backward,* the twenty-first century host, Dr. Leete, replied to a comment of his nineteenth-century visitor, Julian West, that human nature had not changed significantly,

. . . but the conditions of human life have changed, and with them the motives of human action. The organization of society with you was such that officials were under a constant temptation to misuse their power for the private profit of themselves or others. Under such circumstances it seems almost strange that you dared entrust them with any of your affairs. Nowadays, on the contrary, society is so constituted that there is absolutely no way in which an official, however ill-disposed, could possibly make a profit for himself or any one else by a misuse of his power. Let him be as bad an official as you please, he cannot be a corrupt one. There is no motive to be. The social system no longer offers a premium on dishonesty.[24]

What had been changed was the social system; as Julian West pointed out to his host, the principle of national organization which had changed the motivations of human behavior was simply the application of "the principle of universal military service, as it was understood in our day, to the labor question." [25] This Dr. Leete admitted, and added that the pattern of national service was "rather a matter of course than of compulsion." The compulsory aspect had come to seem so natural that no one considered it compulsory any longer. Nonetheless, he was prepared to admit that even the term compulsion was too weak; national service was to be absolutely inevitable:

23. Edward Bellamy, *Equality* (New York, 1897), p. 17.
24. Schiffman, *op. cit.,* p. 94.
25. *Ibid.,* p. 95.

> Our entire social order is so wholly based upon and deduced from it that if it were conceivable that a man could escape it, he would be left with no possible way to provide for his existence. He would have excluded himself from the world, cut himself off from his kind, in a word, committed suicide.[26]

Solidarity was, then, not merely proposed as an ideal, but insisted upon as a norm. The nation, as employer, maintained the obligation of every citizen to contribute to the well-being of all.

Eminent fairness was established in the allocation of jobs. What, in nineteenth century society, had been regarded as menial jobs, were, in line with socialist conceptions of equality, to be regarded as on a par with other services. Solidarist society had reformulated the golden rule in terms of service:

> Nowadays it is an axiom of ethics that to accept a service from another which we would be unwilling to return in kind, if need were, is like borrowing with the intention of not repaying, while to enforce such a service by taking advantage of the poverty or necessity of a person would be an outrage like forcible robbery.[27]

Whatever may be, or have been the case in primitive life, civilization is founded on the interdependency of man. The theory of solidarity expresses the fact of social life:

> In a state of society so barbarous as not even to know family coöperation, each individual may possibly support himself, though even then for a part of his life only; but from the moment that men begin to live together, and constitute even the rudest sort of society, self-support becomes impossible. As men grow more civilized, and the subdivision of occupations and services is carried out, a complex mutual dependence becomes the universal rule. Every man, however solitary may seem his occupation, is a member of a vast industrial partnership, as large as the nation, as large as humanity. The necessity of mutual dependence should imply the duty and guarantee of mutual support.[28]

Granted the obligation to serve the whole, and the equal worth of every type of service to the society, the question of what part of the total product should be allotted to each man as a recompense can be regarded as a moral rather than a material question. A man's title to what he receives "is his humanity. The basis of his claim is the fact

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 95 f.
27. Bellamy, *Looking Backward, 2000-1887* (New York, n.d.), p. 156.
28. Schiffman, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-3.

that he is a man." [29] As long as a man does his best he is on a moral equality with every other man who does his best, even though the amount of their productive output may vary. "Desert is a moral question, and the amount of the product a material quantity. It would be an extraordinary sort of logic which should try to determine a moral question by a material standard." [30]

With such comments as this, we have come full circle; the social ideal grew out of the religious ideal of solidarity, and now the social ideal itself returns to a religious expression. The social Utopia has returned to the religious millennium; the two are one, even in their expression. Social reformer and religious prophet have come together again in Bellamy as they were together in Amos and Isaiah and Jesus. In the very same age in which the Catholic Church was finally making its peace with capitalism,[31] and in which American Protestantism was beginning to slough off the shackles of alliance with materialism and to turn toward the social vision of Rauschenbusch, Bellamy, descendant of Christian theologians and disciple of Auguste Comte—this Schiffman's background researches prove beyond peradventure [32]—had found the prophetic vision of a transcendental humanism.

That this transcendental humanism should have found expression in "The Religion of Solidarity" in passages of prophetic intensity and apocalyptic zeal is not at all surprising. In the context of the early pamphlet the reader expects to find the author saying:

> Spread your wings; you will reach no horizon. Cast out the lead; it will strike no bottom. Our little wells are filled from this eternal life; our souls are not islands in the void, but peninsulas forming one continent of life within the universe. It is man's own indolence that will inhabit but one corner of the open universe, a corner of himself. Let him assume his birthright, and live out, live up, in others, in the past, in the future, in nature, in God. There are no barriers to the soul but such as sense-bound fancy imagines.[33]

It is rather more surprising to be made to realize, by the excellent and judicious selections from *Equality* and from *Looking Backward* that

29. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 110 f.
31. In Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical, *Rerum Novarum* (1891).
32. Schiffman, *op. cit.*, p. xx.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Mr. Schiffman has included, that Bellamy's apocalyptic tone was carried over into parts of his description of the socialist-nationalist Utopia of his twenty-first century millennium:

> The great enthusiasm of humanity which overthrew the old order and brought in the fraternal society was not primarily or consciously a godward aspiration at all. It was essentially a humane movement. It was a melting and flowing forth of men's hearts toward one another, a rush of contrite, repentant tenderness, an impassioned impulse of mutual love and self-devotion to the commonweal. But "if we love one another, God dwelleth in us," and so men found it. It appears that there came a moment, the most transcendent moment in the history of the race of man, when with the fraternal glow of this world of new-found embracing brothers there seems to have mingled the ineffable thrill of a divine participation, as if the hand of God were clasped over the joined hands of men. And so it has continued to this day and shall forevermore.[34]

This quotation comes from a part of *Equality* that is devoted to a discussion of the question of religion in the new society and the new age, and so its content as well as its tone is specifically religious. In reading, in the light of Schiffman's Introduction and the materials included in his first section ("The Religion of Solidarity"), the selections from other, non-religious sections of Bellamy's novels, one is gradually forced to the conviction that the entire social vision is millennial and that much of it, regardless of subject, is apocalyptically presented.

> Can you be surprised that we look back to the great Revolution as a sort of second creation of man, inasmuch as it added the conditions of an adequate mind and soul life to the bare physical existence under more or less agreeable conditions, which was about all the life the most of human beings, rich or poor, had up to that time known? . . . Youth is visited with noble aspirations and high dreams of duty and perfection. It sees the world as it should be, not as it is; and it is well for the race if the institutions of society are such as do not offend these moral enthusiasms, but rather tend to conserve and develop them through life. This, I think, we may fully claim the modern social order does. Thanks to an economic system which illustrates the highest ethical idea in all its workings, the youth going forth into the world finds it a practical school for all the moralities. He finds full room and scope in its duties and occupations for every generous enthusiasm, every unselfish aspiration he ever cherished. He cannot possibly have formed a moral idea higher or completer than that which dominates our industrial and commercial order.[35]

34. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

We must not be misled by the fact that this passage is written in the present tense; it is written *as if from a millennial future*. It is a part of a completely secularized eschatology.

In the light of the materials that Schiffman has collected and of the interpretation that he has given in his Introduction, it is now possible clearly to see the relation between such secular social reformers as Bellamy, Gronlund (from whom Bellamy drew so many ideas),[36] and Henry George, and the impulse in American religious life which, at this very time, was bringing the Christianity of the Social Gospel to birth. American secular ideas could so far enter into the thought of a Christian theologian of the 1880's that Elisha Mulford was impelled to write his "institute of theology" under the title, *The Republic of God*.[37] The language and imagery of the Christian tradition could so far enter the thought of the secular social thinkers that Henry George could envisage the Single-Tax program as bringing about "the City of God on Earth," that Laurence Gronlund could believe that his "co-operative commonwealth" would bring "rapture" and "blessedness" in its achievement,[38] and that Edward Bellamy could think of his nationalism as producing the "transcendent" moment when the "hand of God" was "clasped over the joined hands of men." Secular social reform and Christian spirituality had come to the point where they were ready to agree on both goals and language. It was the special distinction and contribution of the theologians of the Social Gospel to have formulated the statement that expressed the common concern and thus to have drawn most of the secular reformers back into the orbit of the Christian Church.

36. Cf. Gronlund, *op. cit.*, p. viii.
37. (Boston, 1881).
38. Gronlund, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

BOOK REVIEWS

Der Göttliche Schelm: Ein Indianischer Mythen-Zyklus. By Paul Radin, Karl Kerényi, and C. G. Jung. Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1955. 218 pp.

The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology. By Paul Radin. With Commentaries by Karl Kerényi and C. G. Jung. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956. xi, 211 pp. 12*s.*

This unusual book has an unusual history. Having devoted a great deal of his life's work to the exploration of the culture and the recording of the ritual literature of the Sioux-speaking Winnebago tribe, Professor Paul Radin received their secret and sacred trickster myth as early as 1912 from his most reliable Indian collaborator, Sam Blowsnake, who had "authentically acquired" (i.e., bought) the text from an old Nebraska Winnebago, one of the very few entitled to tell the story. Mr. Radin is convinced that Blowsnake had added or changed nothing in the authentic version that had been known to the Winnebagos since about 1800. The text, originally taken down in the Winnebago syllable script, was first translated by two Indians perfectly in command of the English language and then thoroughly checked by Mr. Radin, who reads and speaks Winnebago quite well.

More than forty years later a German translation of this English text has now appeared, including a brief preface and a detailed anthropological analysis by Professor Radin, in addition to "Mythologische Epilegomena," by the eminent scholar of classical mythology, Professor Karl Kerényi, and an essay "Zur Psychology der Schelmenfigur" by Dr. C. G. Jung, the Swiss analytical psychologist. This complex book, as the reviewer was told, can not be published in the United States, since the post office would refuse to distribute the publication by mail because of some strange Rabelaisian sexual and fecal adventures of the hero. Recently an English edition, which the reviewer has not seen, appeared in London containing Radin's English original text and analysis, and an English translation of Kerényi's and Jung's essays.

All three learned authors agree that the figure of the trickster, the *Schelm,* the *picaro,* is one of the earliest types from the archaic period of mankind that has survived in scores of variations through the ages, in all parts of the world, up to the present day. The importance of

the Winnebago cycle of trickster stories, known in similar versions to almost all other Indian tribes, consists in the evidence that large parts of it mirror the primordial times when the human consciousness was relatively dim and undeveloped and man was not able to think and to tell about himself, his struggle in the world, and about gods and spirits, except in primitive mythological and symbolical terms. This Indian type of the trickster, an amorphous mixture of divine, human, and animal traits, is a base and, at the same time, a foolish and amusing opponent of the archaic order and the strict Indian tribal social organization.

His name in the Winnebago myth is Wadjunkajo, which means "Foolish One, Trickster." He is a shrewd blockhead who cheats and is being cheated; his tricks and experiences are gigantic, and so is his humor and physical and sexual appetite. Like all tales of tricksters, *picaros,* Eulenspiegels, up to the present time, this early Indian trickster's story consists of many stories, many episodes, and many pranks, held together merely by the leitmotif of the wanderlust, his continual wandering from place to place, from adventure to adventure. This mythological Eulenspiegel is simultaneously stupid and cunning, like the hundreds of his less amorphous successors in world literature. In the Winnebago version his endless bowels, his enormous phallus, his anus, are independent parts of his body. He gives them special tasks, they are punished, and he talks to them as he talks with other mythological beings or with trees and animals, the "big brother" with the "little brothers." He is flabbergasted when his own hands fight and wound each other; he is suddenly transformed into other shapes, even into a woman who marries the chief's son and bears children. He likes to eat children as much as he likes to beget them. On the one hand he trusts everybody and is usually betrayed, on the other hand he abuses, deceives, chastises everybody in the meanest way and takes horrible revenge on his enemies.

In some of the later episodes of the cycle, however, this tricky and ridiculous monster develops into a human being and, finally, into a cultural hero who removes things and beings harmful to men and creates useful things, for instance, edible plants, from the superfluous parts of his penis. In the last episode he goes to heaven after a last meal, not without leaving the imprint of his buttocks and other organs on the rock where he sat, as traces of his earthly days.

Radin proclaims, in his preface, that the trickster represents, in the last analysis, a psychological problem, "an attempt of man to solve his inner and outer problems." Therefore he explains the cycle of these myths from their particular cultural background; Kerényi follows him, finding parallels in Greek mythology and civilization, and Jung analyses the archetype of the trickster and his survival as the perennial "mirror of an early, elementary stage of consciousness," a "collective shadow-figure and summation of all individual inferior character qualities," having "a psychotherapeutic effect" on more highly developed men.

The lover of literature, psychology, and anthropology certainly will enjoy greatly this hitherto unknown trickster cycle and its perfect analysis by three wise men, but perhaps he will miss sufficient emphasis on one important trait common to all tales of pranksters from the archaic to the contemporary specimens, namely their crass, revealing realism, social criticism, and satire. Of this we find enough in the Wadjunkajo cycle; we find it in the Homeric hymn of thievish, sly young Hermes, in the funny rogues of strolling Greek mimes, the Phlyakes, or the Roman Atellanae, caricaturing the foibles of gods and men, revived after 1,500 years in the foolish, gossipy stock types of the Commedia dell'Arte. The word *Schelm,* identified in Germany of long ago as the executioner as well as Till Eulenspiegel and his pranks, who appears again in the nineteenth century in de Coster's magnificent novel *Tyl Ulenspiegel,* outwitting with rugged sagacity the oppressors and tormentors of his country, and in the twentieth century in Hauptmann's epic, *Till Eulenspiegel,* as the venturesome vagrant whose experiences describe in realistic pictures the chaotic conditions after the first World War.

The adventurous travels of the trickster have always been brought in relation to the manners, trends, and social types of the respective periods, portraying and simultaneously satirizing them. The presentation of the trickster is often the only possible means of criticism and attack, as in the Oriental Nasr eddin Hodscha and the shadow play figure, Karagöz. Rabelais' colossal rascals indicate the opposition of Humanism to the Middle Ages, and the Spanish picaresque novels of the sixteenth century, since Lazarillo de Tormes and Guzman de Alfarache, are realistic satires on the romantic novels of noble knights and refined aristocrats in the highfaluting style of *Amadis,* just as

eighteenth century France's *Gil Blas* and *Figaro* are attacks against outlived feudalism.

The trickster became "Simplicius Simplicissimus" in Grimmelshausen's bitter stories about the Thirty Years' War, and "Schelmuffsky" in Christian Reuter's burlesque lampoon of bragging phony travel tales. He ascended to a classic level in Goethe's hexametric epic, *Reineke Fuchs,* descended to the crude and coarse but popular types of Clown and Hanswurst, and was elevated again by comedians of the movies to Charlie Chaplin's tragic simpleton. The immortal trickster finally became Hasek's "good soldier Schweik," who, by his cunning stupidity, defeats military power and bureaucracy in the First World War, and, in the Second, Will Stockdale in "No Time for Sergeants." Felix Krull is the last and most polished specimen so far derived from the archaic rogue, in Thomas Mann's grandiose and amusing satire on bourgeois life about 1900. Like their ancestor, Wadjunkajo, all these *picaros* represent the same symbol of primordial instinctive strength, destructive and creative, beyond good and evil, and, by their drastic pranks, are such a menace to law and order—but give so much pleasure and fun to suffering mankind.

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The All-Knowing God: Researches into Early Religion and Culture. By RAFFAELE PETTAZZONI. Translation by H. J. Rose. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1956. xv, 475 pp. 60 illustrations. 60*s.*

The Italian original of this book, *L'Omniscienza di Dio,* made so fine an impression in circles interested in the discipline of Comparative Religion that this competent English translation is assured of a wide circle of interested readers. As its title indicates, it is an approach to the study of that important concept in the monotheistic religions, the Divine omniscience, by assembling a vast body of material from accounts available to us of the religions prevalent among a wide variety of peoples, ancient and modern, civilized and relatively uncivilized, which may illustrate the development of this concept of a deity who is all-knowing. Since no one man can possibly have first-hand knowledge of all these varied peoples and cultures, the researcher is necessarily at the mercy of his informants. That, of course, is true of

researchers in many fields, but it is particularly unfortunate in the field of religion, where the unreliability of informants is notorious and is so difficult to guard against. The author is aware of this, in fact in certain cases calls attention to it, but throughout the book one is constantly pausing to ask how reliable such and such a report about this or that belief or practice is, and what validity there may be to our generalizations based on such varied material.

Though the concept of omniscience has been most important in the monotheistic religions, it is well known also in polytheistic religions, and it will probably come as a surprise to many readers to discover how clear is the evidence for it among peoples whom we regard as relatively low in the scale of civilization. Equally surprising is the unexpected way in which it often appears in a religion. To the Muslim the concept of omniscience is quite simple, for the orthodox theologians have stated that Allah knows all that is, all that has been, and all that will be, and of that which is not He knows what it would have been if it had been. Historically, however, the problem is not so simple. Among quite a number of peoples we have record of a Supreme Deity who was by no means regarded as omniscient. For example, in the Hittite myth of Telepinus, his father, the Weather God, had no idea where the vanished Telepinus has gone, so the bee has to be sent out to discover him. On the other hand, we have record of deities being regarded as omniscient who are far from being the Supreme God to their worshippers, e.g., Helios among the Greeks, who is only the son of Hyperion and grandson of Uranus. Indeed, among some peoples omniscience is attributed to creatures who are not even gods. So two questions emerge: (1) what precisely we mean by omnisscience when we speak of a deity being omniscient, (2) what type of deity it is who is regarded as possessing omniscience.

Dr. Pettazzoni thinks that his survey of all this material he has gathered from the records of the Ancient Near East, from India and Iran, from Greece and Rome, from the Kelts and Slavs and Ural-Altaics, from China and Oceania, from the primitives of Africa, Indonesia, and the Americas, enables him to conclude that the omniscience of God, historically considered, does not mean His knowledge of Quaternions or the structures of Thermo-dynamics, but His all-embracing knowledge of the activities and conduct of man, and is concerned in a quite peculiar way with bringing chastisement on man for

his evil doing. As to the type of deity to whom omniscience is ascribed, his theory is that omniscience is an attribute reserved for sky gods, whether the sky itself, or celestial bodies in the sky, sun gods and such like, or deities associated with meteorological phenomena, weather gods, wind gods, etc. Since, however, there are quite a number of deities of other types to whom omniscience is ascribed, e.g., serpent gods, ancestral gods, etc., he is compelled to make a distinction between a "magical" wisdom which confers omniscience, and a "seeing" wisdom which is conditioned by light, whereby the deity is omniscient because He looks down and sees all the ways of men, even those they think are hidden, and judges men on the evidence of what He has seen.

In searching for the original form of this attribute of Divine omniscience, he follows the modern tendency to associate different types of religion with types of culture-structure, and thinks that this particular notion originated in the more advanced stage of the hunting culture. He admits that the idea of a Supreme Being as Lord of the Animals may have arisen at an early stage in the hunting cultures, but argues that the omniscience of such a Lord of the Animals would have been only what he distinguishes as "magical" wisdom, while at the higher stage, that of the pastoral culture, appears the true omniscience of the Sky God, whose figure historically lies behind the Varuna of the Vedas, the Yahweh of the Old Testament, the Ahura Mazda of the Gathas, and the Allah of the Qur'an. It is only a transfer of this when we find omniscience attributed to the Mother goddess or the fertility deities of an agricultural culture, and the definition of Allah's omniscience by the later Muslim theologians would be only a sophisticated elaboration of the original idea.

Whether the reader reacts favorably or unfavorably to the theories of the book, he cannot fail to be impressed by the research that has gone into its making, or to be grateful for the truly immense amount of carefully assembled and admirably presented material here made available to students on a subject often enough discussed, but about which we have hitherto had far too little accurate information to provide a sound basis for discussion. Ample material is here, and is excellently arranged and critically discussed, which in itself is an important contribution to scholarship.

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The Great Mother. By Erich Neumann. New York: Pantheon Books, 1955. (Bollingen Series XLVII.) xliii, 380 pp. $7.50.

The Great Mother is an attempt at a structural analysis of an archetype. Long before archetypal experiences became fundamental to Analytical Psychology, St. Augustine dealt with this problem. In his writings on the *principale formae* St. Augustine gives a rendering of archetypical experiences. He writes:

> Ideas are certain primary forms (*principale formae*) or pattern of things, abiding and unchangeable, not created and therefore eternal and forever the same, contained in the divine mind. . . . But the soul can only behold them as a rational soul, . . . as if it (the soul) were a face and its (own) inner intellectual eye. . . . If Plato called these things "ideas," they are not only ideas, but they are true, because they are eternal and because they remain the same and unchangeable. Through participation in them it happens that everything is what it is and how it is.[1]

The comprension of existential experiences of this kind is particularly difficult for the man of today, reared as he is on a diet of materialism and positivism. Education today is centered upon word thinking and directed towards the discouragement of thinking in images. Imaging as a faculty of cognition has fallen into disrepute. Paul Tillich writes:

> C. G. Jung has called the history of Protestantism a history of continuous "iconoclasm" and, consequently, the separation of our consciousness from the universally human archetypes that are present in the subconscious of everybody. He is right. Protestants often confuse essential symbols with accidental signs. They often are unaware of the numinous power inherent in genuine symbols. . . . They have replaced the great wealth of symbols appearing in the Christian tradition by rational concepts, moral laws and subjective emotions. This . . . was a consequence of the Protestant protest against the superstitious use of the traditional symbols in Roman Catholicism and in all paganism. But here . . . the protest has endangered its own basis.[2]

It is in this context that the book is significant. Erich Neumann, a disciple of Jung, divides his book into two parts. Part I deals with the theory of the archetypes as expounded by Jung; ". . . no explanation of the psychic can be anything other than the living process of the psyche itself," [3] said Jung, whose work cannot be pressed into a system. It is the very sign of Jung's greatness that he recognized the

1. *De Quaestionibus Octaginta Tribus.* Q. 46, De Ideis (Migne P.L.XL).
2. *The Protestant Era,* p. xxxix.
3. *Spirit and Nature,* p. 433.

psyche as a living river into which "you cannot step twice, as ever new waters are flowing in upon you."

Neumann, theorizing about the archetypes on his own, however, is engulfed in a sea of ambiguities. It is of the essence of archetypal experience that an archetype cannot be directly observed. What can be observed are recurring psychic phenomena in dreams and waking mental life from which their existence is inferred. To ask what archetypes are is meaningless, just as meaningless as to ask what energy is. The archetypes are manifestations of energy which the psyche cognizes qualitatively, and which are, as it were, embodied in symbols. This fact the author recognizes, saying: "Because so many contradictory motifs and symbols are joined in the archetype, its nature is paradoxical: it can neither be visualized nor represented" (p. 12). But in further chapters of Part I, nevertheless, he proceeds to produce various schemata and writes:

> If we look back over the schemata and observe how the archetype of the Feminine has unfolded, how it becomes differentiated *in accordance with our circles and axes* (my italics), how it is *concretized* (my italics) in the symbol group of the vessel, how it shifts at the poles of the axes and passes through the point of indifference, we shall *perhaps* (my italics) have gained an intimation of the unity and multiplicity of the living archetype" (pp. 81 ff.).

Anticipating criticism on being arbitrary and far from reality, Neumann writes: "They (the criticisms) will be powerless to alter the fact that psychic reality evades our desire for schematic exposition (p. 83)." While to simplify is to falsify, to embrace a living experience with a formula and to confine it into—however complex—schemata is to strangle.

As critical as we must be about this section of Part I, just so appreciative we must be of Part II. The author collates in abundance mythological, archeological, and artistic material which provides a "living" proof of the reality of archetypal experiences throughout the ages. Neumann has studiously collected material from all corners of the world, creating a rich source of information for the student of comparative religion, anthropology, and psychology. Departing from an historical approach he demonstrates the compresence of varied levels of experience which are as active in the psyche of man today as they were in his past. And these experiences are illustrated by approximately 260 well produced plates.

The author divides the text of Part II into sections dealing with the elementary and transformative character of the Great Mother; he shows the Primordial Goddess in her positive and negative character, as the "great Round" embracing the sky and the earth, as "The Lady of the Plants" and "The Lady of the Beasts" and lastly in her aspect as Sophia, the vessel of spiritual transformation.

Part II of the book is a living demonstration of the Great Goddess as a manifestation of *part* of the "underlying power that even today—partly with the same symbols and in the same order of unfolding and partly in dynamic modulations and variations—determines the psychic history of modern man and modern woman."

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The Path of the Budda: Buddhism Interpreted by Buddhists. Edited by KENNETH J. MORGAN. New York: The Ronald Press, 1956. vii, 432 pp. $5.00.

In preparing this volume, Professor Morgan, who is University Chaplain at Colgate University and teacher in its Department of Religion and Philosophy, has followed a method first tried out successfully in his earlier work *The Religion of the Hindus.* The aim has been to make available to readers brought up in the Greek-Hebrew-Christian tradition descriptions of the Eastern religions written by qualified scholars within the communities of the religions themselves. Chapters thus prepared have been arranged and edited by Mr. Morgan to give unified presentation of the material. Where several writers treat of aspects of the same religion the method unavoidably involves some overlapping; and, where the emphasis is on exposition of traditions, the results of critico-historical analysis are left unconsidered. There is value in the treatment, however, for it affords Westerners something of the inside feel of the faiths as known to those who follow them, and it brings to light some features not easily grasped by purely objective scholarship.

Eleven Buddhist writers have contributed the eight chapters of this book. The range of their topics is wide. Writing on the origin and expansion of Buddhism, J. Kashyap covers the story of Buddha's life, his teachings, the founding of his order, schools of thought, periods

of art, and the decline in India. Expansion outside India is briefly sketched for lands of Southeast Asia, Central Asia, China, Korea, Japan, and Tibet. U Thittila, on fundamental principles of Theravāda, presents a well-proportioned systematic exposition of essential doctrines. Ananda Thero reckons with modifications in ideas and practices in varying environments of Ceylon and other lands of Southern Asia. Susumi Yamaguchi, with delicate discernment, analyzes the emergence and development of the Mahāyāna beliefs characteristic of Northern Buddhism. Tracing the fortunes of the religion in China and Korea, Zenryu Tsukamoto brings out effectively the role of devoted Indian and Chinese monks in conveying and translating basic Sanskrit works from India; he also points out the transformations in ideas as Chinese minds worked over the materials, giving clear-cut brief descriptions of the numerous sects that emerged.

Most freshly informative, perhaps, is the long chapter by Lobsang Phuntsok Lhalungpa on Buddhism in Tibet. Only a Tibetan can write adequately on the complicated mixed form of religion in this land. In this case the writer, who is an official of the Tibetan government in Kalimpong, India, is well qualified. His account sets in just perspective the many elements—Bonist nature worship, Tantrism in its higher meanings as well as its corruptions, labors of reformers, rise of sects and sub-sects, the significance of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, functions of other lamas, monks and laymen, and lastly the Tibetan scriptures, including an ordered systematic account of their doctrines. The whole is impressive, both for completeness and conciseness.

To cover Buddhism in Japan four specialists were needed for the chapter. Shinso Hanayama traces the history through successive cultural epochs. For contemporary forms, Mitsuyuku Ishida writes of Shin and Jodo, Reiho Masunaga of Zen, Shobun Kubota of the Nichiren Sect, and Shinso Hanayama of developments after the Kamakura Era down to the present day. Together, these essays though necessarily brief, furnish an inclusive view of the established traditions in Japan.

The final chapter is broadly interpretative. It deals with unity and diversity in Buddhism. Mr. Hajime Nakamura puts his net through the diversity, so to speak, and separates out the large universal factors which are the enduring characteristics of the religion. These are its sense of mission, its tolerance, rationalism, sympathy for all suffering,

and its ethics of self-discipline and compassion. He notes the personalized ideals in the Buddha, the Arahat, and the Bodhisattva, and respect for the law of moral retribution or *karma*, even if variously interpreted. He does not overlook differences in both thought and practice between Theravāda and Mahāyāna forms of Buddhism, but he sees good signs in increasing co-operative activities, and his hope is that more interchange and travel in our day will bring these two communities closer together. So Buddhism may once more reach out "to bring the people of Asia to the Path of the Buddha."

As a presentation of the enduring traditions of Buddhism in all their impressive variety this volume leaves little to be desired. From it the Western student can know more surely what Buddhists themselves think of their own religion. How the picture may change in the light of advancing critico-historical studies is another matter. Meanwhile, the traditions themselves should be justly comprehended.

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Yahweh and Baal. By GUNNAR ÖSTBORN. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1956. 106 pp. Kr. 10:50.

It is a commonplace of contemporary study of the Old Testament that the major tension within Israel's religion consisted in its pervasive emphasis upon a historical revelation as over against the stress upon nature in the surrounding cults. It has long been recognized that the portrayal of Near Eastern cults, notably that of Canaan, has been colored by polemical interests. But it is certainly possible to exaggerate this contrast or rather to misstate it, since the religion of Israel was from the beginning occupied with the realm of nature as well as that of history. To be sure, the concept of "nature" as such, like that of "history," is absent from the Old Testament, but Yahweh's sovereignty over the heavenly bodies, the fertility of the soil and the gift of rain, and the forces of earth and sea receives repeated emphasis. Indeed, the development of this divine sovereignty over the forces of nature is one of the major features of the religion of Israel. Nevertheless, so long as contemporary materials from Canaan were not available, it was precarious to accept the biblical representations at face value. But now that the myths and rituals from ancient Ugarit, discovered at Ras esh-

Shamra in 1929, are at our disposal, it is possible to gain a much more accurate picture of the nature of Canaanite worship, against which the prophets inveigh in season and out, and to view it in much clearer perspective. A considerable literature has quite naturally gathered about the subject. We are now able to see clearly, as we were not able before, and to understand the motivations and aspirations of those who worshiped the gods of the Canaanite pantheon. Among them, of course, Baal holds a position of pre-eminent importance. Within the last two or three years, Arvin Kapelrud, of the University of Oslo, has discussed *Baal in the Ras Shamra Texts,* and Marvin Pope, of Yale University, has written on *El in the Ugaritic Texts.* Gunnar Östborn now addresses himself to the subject of *Yahweh and Baal.* It must be recognized that scholars have discovered literally hundreds of interesting affinities between the Ugaritic texts and the Old Testament. That there was a close relation between Israel and Canaan goes without saying, but precisely what this relationship was is a matter for careful examination. Östborn opens his discussion by saying that the relation between Yahweh and Baal in ancient Israel may be designated as the main problem of Old Testament religion.

The monograph consists of twenty-four brief but compact sections. In each of these Östborn undertakes to describe a particular aspect of the character of Yahweh. He then turns to the representations of Baal religion both within the Old Testament and in the Ugaritic texts and points out that in every case we have a parallel emphasis. The problem of comparison and contrast here is admittedly difficult. It is easy to become apologetic on the one hand, or to exaggerate similarities, on the other. Östborn makes a valiant effort to assess the situation properly, and this is all the more commendable in view of the excesses of those with whom he is most closely associated professionally. He calls attention to the presence of identical motives in Yahwism and Baalism, but then he points out where the former is distinctive. Both Yahweh and Baal are related to El, but in the case of the former the two are coalesced into a single deity. Both Yahwism and Baalism know the covenant relation, and both are described as a marriage relation, but only the former interprets the relation as existing with a people. Baalism also knows an "Exodus," according to Östborn, following Engnell (p. 32), "the going-out to the sacral-cultic festival," the center of which is the *hieros gamos;* but in Israel the Exodus was a real his-

torical event, not a sacred marriage. Yahweh is pre-eminently the God of history (pp. 39-43), but, although in the history of Baal there is no event remotely approximating the deliverance from Egypt, "Baal also guided history." It must be admitted that the evidence adduced is questionable; Isa. 48:5 is hardly sufficient support. Östborn then proceeds to describe Yahweh's character as Savior, Creator, Father, King, Judge, the God of ethics, the God of cult, the God of knowledge, the God of harmony, the God of love, the God of unity, the God of covenant, and finally, and climatically, "Yahweh—Demanding Listening" and "the God of the Word." It can be seen from this summary that the author correctly discerns the major features of the biblical representation of Yahweh. Östborn confines himself for the most part to the Book of Hosea, where the tensions between Baal worship and Yahweh worship are acute. But the problems of this book are notoriously difficult, and at many points one would question his understanding of the text. Not infrequently the author follows the interpretations of H. S. Nyberg in his *Studien zum Hoseabuche* (Uppsala, 1935).

The monograph suffers from its complete ignoring of the results of higher criticism. No attempt is made to distinguish between primary and secondary material. We are told that Hosea knows the main contents of the Tetrateuch, that he was a proponent of the royal cult in the Temple of Jerusalem, and that he looked to the coming of the Davidic king. More serious is his contention that the interpretations of Israel's history are drawn from the ideology of the Canaanite nature cult, "the cult drama in which the king-god was the central figure of a course of events proceeding from struggle to victory, from distress to salvation, from sufferings to glory, from disorder to creation, from death to life." In other words, history is presented in the pattern of fixed motifs drawn from the nature cults. Fortunately, there are other sections where the uniqueness of historical life is better understood. One of the most interesting sections of the book is the discussion of the mother characteristics in Yahweh. Östborn believes that the emphasis on Yahweh as Father is not strong in the Old Testament, and interprets Hos. 11:1 ff. as referring to the mother. His stress upon "eternal life" in Hosea is questionable. On the other hand, his treatment of Israel's forgetfulness of Yahweh is salutary. The references to the king, as in Hos. 13:10 and elsewhere, are said to refer to Baal as Melek, and the princes are members of the pantheon. The book

swarms with misprints. Nevertheless, the discussion as a whole is both stimulating and rewarding, and it comes to grips in a serious way with one of the major problems of the religion of ancient Israel in its relationship to the Canaanite cult.

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The State in the New Testament. By OSCAR CULLMANN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. xi, 123 pp. $2.50.

Some contemporary problems, Professor Cullmann points out, were "actually posed and solved by the New Testament"; and one of them is the question of the relation of the church to the state. The solution reached was that the state is "provisional," that is to say, it belongs to a world which has been brought to an end in the work of Christ but still remains because the final consummation has not yet come. Romans 13 and Revelation 13 appear to be contradictory, but actually they refer to two kinds of states, the one which stands under God's authority and the one which deifies itself in totalitarian fashion. (We shall return to this point.)

His first chapter deals with the political situation in Palestine in the time of Jesus. Two extremes were to be found, ranging from the Sadducees, who collaborated with the Romans (as some Pharisees also did) to the Zealots who actively resisted Roman rule. Cullmann argues that while Jesus himself was not a Zealot (against Eisler), nevertheless, Simon the Cananaean "*certainly* belonged to the Zealots," and "others *probably* did, like Judas Iscariot, Peter, and *possibly* the sons of Zebedee." Jesus was no Zealot, but he criticized the state while renouncing attempts to overthrow it. As Cullmann observes, it has sometimes been doubted that the Zealot movement actually existed in the time of Jesus. But the force of his observations would still remain even if one were to speak, rather clumsily, of "pre-Zealots" and emphasize the attitude toward Rome rather than the name.

In his second chapter he goes on to argue that Jesus was executed as a Zealot leader, though he was not one. Rendering unto Caesar means paying taxes to him (against the Zealot view), although rendering unto God means returning one's whole self in devotion to God. The complexity of Jesus' view meant that he was misunderstood by

his disciples, by the people, and by the Romans, and that he was crucified as King of the Jews. "The injustice of the Roman State in condemning Jesus does not consist in a totalitarian excess, but in the fact that it did not take the trouble to ascertain and to *understand* Jesus' *real* attitude" (p. 54; a point with which I heartily agree).

In analyzing Romans 13:1 ff., Cullmann points out the importance of considering I Corinthians 6:1 ff. as well, and argues that the latter passage sets limits to the recognition of the state, since Christians "are not to make use of the State's legitimate institutions of justice." The state is not divine; it is merely willed or ordained by God—just as, we might add, the whole creation is not divine but is the work of the Creator (Rom. 1:25). Indeed, we might suggest that the problem of the state would find greater illumination in relation to the doctrine of creation than from a discussion of angelic or demonic powers, although it is of course implicit in the latter.

Cullmann rightly rejects a purely mythological approach to the Apocalypse of John, and sees in the "beast from the abyss" the Roman empire, "insofar as it requires the worship of the emperor" (p. 73). We agree with him that the author of the Apocalypse believes that emperor-worship, or at any rate beast-worship, is required. But we find unambiguous evidence for such a requirement only in the exceptional case of Pliny and the Christians in Bithynia (Pliny, *Ep.* x. 96). Trajan's reply to Pliny does not commend the use of the emperor's image, and there is no later evidence for its use. Here again, however, we cannot deny that the requirement to offer sacrifices to the gods of Rome had the same theological meaning. It meant, or at least implied, the deification of the state.

Thus Cullmann provides a theological explanation for the apparent difference between Romans and Revelation, an explanation which does justice to the changing historical situations of the state (in his view both documents come from Nero's reign, p. 70) and to the "tensions" of Christian eschatology. Sometimes he seems to oversimplify historical situations, as when he expresses the view that, up to the time of Constantine, the state demanded emperor-worship and therefore remained "a satanic power" (p. 79). This view neglects the complexity and variety in Roman policy, which made the problem even more acute for Christians.

An excursus at the end of the book deals with the meaning of

"powers" in Romans 13:1, the subject of vigorous, even bitter, controversy in Germany. Against Bultmann and especially von Campenhausen, Cullmann holds that the concept of "powers" refers both to the state and to angelic powers related to it. As he says, his general picture of Paul's view of the state does not depend on this passage, but his special interpretation (which seems to be correct in view of Pauline usage) reinforces his general one. The angelic powers have been subjected by Christ and therefore are of God. On the other hand, I should not give up any notion of natural law in Paul's thought so readily as Cullmann does.

This book should be read by anyone concerned with biblical theology or with the problems of church and state, for it provides a significant clarification of points at which these areas come together.

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Das Praedestinationsproblem in der Theologie Augustins. By GOTTHARD NYGREN. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1956. 306 pp. Kr. 20.

The program of this remarkably thorough and mature doctoral dissertation is so to analyze predestination in Augustine as to contribute to an appropriate historical characterization of his whole theology. The "doctrine" of predestination is said emphatically to arise out of Augustine's biblically oriented (chiefly Pauline) conception of grace, rather than the philosophical milieu of his thought. The "problem" side appears where grace is so interpreted as to nullify the Church's invitation to faith, its admonition to good works, and the universal applicability of grace. Thus conceived, the themes of theodicy and freedom of will, while constant and powerful elements of Augustine's thought (as they were in all the ancient fathers) have their place assigned by the conception of grace, rather than vice versa. His understanding of Paul gave Augustine the unique and epoch-making formulation by which, throughout a long life, he would relinquish neither side of the theodicy-free-will dilemma, and thus rooted his whole system firmly in an incomprehensible and ineluctable paradox. Nygren links the early *Ad Simplicianum,* the later *De Libero Arbitrio,* and the final *De Dono Perseverantiae,* to show the constancy of the problem and general consistency of treatment, and to insist that herein lies a

clue to Augustine's major theological endeavors. "The fact must be accounted for that Augustine worked for about thirty years in the same general thought scheme, without being visibly troubled by this paradoxicality."

In studying the biographical and intellectual origins of this problem, Nygren, after an excellent survey of the controversial literature, follows chiefly Jens Nörregaard and J. J. O'Meara in formulating his own understanding that the centrality of incarnation in the Cassiciacum writings is a clue that grace and sin (although the terminology is scarce) were components of Augustine's thought at this period. He rejects as "unfortunate" the question, "Was Augustine in his earlier work a Christian or a Neoplatonist?" as well as the "authority vs. reason" dilemma, and emphasizes the close and continuing inner connection and mutual modification between the Platonic materials and the doctrine of grace. He argues strongly against the "wholly fruitless" positing of opposition between Christianity and philosophy. "However much from many points of view one may emphasize the fundamental difference between philosophical and Christian tradition, yet it is clear that, at least from a historical point of view, they have a common denominator in men who live in an intellectual and spiritual world where both traditions come together." The historical situation prepared for Augustine's pouring Christian tradition into the forms of philosophical theology, resulting in what Nygren calls, "Christianity as natural religion." This concept (pp. 176 ff.) is carefully formulated and constitutes one of the most rewarding insights in the volume. Augustine was not, however, a *Mischung,* but a unique third way, clearly distinguishable from both Paul and Platonism. The author holds, in agreement with E. Gilson, "that Augustine worked with Neoplatonic lines of thought while disputing the principle bases on which these thoughts rested," and that this "runs throughout the Augustinian theology, and must be regarded as constitutive of it."

The special feature of this monograph is the way in which detailed analysis of a single doctrine bears out this not unprecedented view of the Bishop of Hippo. Augustine, according to Nygren, was successful in interpreting the conception of grace by his general doctrine of Creator-creature, in terms of foreknowledge and predetermination though a subtle and supple distinction between "willed" and "natural" causes. A conception of the relative freedom of human life (neces-

sary to ethical decisions) was thus relatable to God's absolute freedom, and empowering grace was so conceived as to embrace secondary causation and the "merit" of forgiven man by which he receives the reward of eternal life. In so far as Augustine stayed within areas where "ontological-psychological" terminology was fairly interchangeable with "ethical-religious" designations, Nygren finds his thought coherent. This "in so far" is extended brilliantly and sympathetically until the reader begins to wonder if the son of Anders Nygren will go all the way in un-Lundensian approval. But finally Augustine's non-Pauline merit concept (so designated) is linked to that of last judgment to show at length the failure of the towering thought structure:

> While man may be regarded under an ontological point of view as *relatively* independent in relation to the Creator as *causa secunda* beside *causa prima,* the ethical-religious merit conception compels the thought of *absolute* independence. Man must stand before the judgment seat of God as the solely responsible subject. At this point there is no analogy between God and man. Man alone stands under law, and therefore one cannot use the concept of merit at all, except in terms of exclusively human action. At this point it is impossible to carry through consistently the parallel between ontological and ethical religious concepts: Augustine's *religionsphilosophische* synthesis is here finally broken through.

Of great importance in demonstrating this, for Nygren, is the form of Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity, which provides a key to the overall understanding of Creator, creature, and grace—although finally at the expense of the latter.

The above summary, which presents some chief features of this volume, is a most inadequate picture of the closely-reasoned and many-sided argument with its ample citations from the whole range of relevant Augustine material. Numerous instructive excurses on related literature and problems will be discovered only by the close reader, since no index is included and the table of contents is far from adequate. An extremely self-conscious concern for methodological matters, often quite interesting, and a heavy style of writing seem to be the only "dissertation" features of this work of first rate scholarship.

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The Gothic Cathedral: Origins of Gothic Architecture and the Medieval Concept of Order. By Otto von Simson. (Bollingen Series XLVIII.) New York: Pantheon Books, 1956. xxiii, 307 pp. $6.50.

Here is a beautiful volume adorned by many plates—three of them in color—and equipped with abundant footnotes that include quotations in the original Latin, French, and German, with others in English, from writings ancient, medieval, and modern. An Appendix by Ernest Levy, "The Proportions of the South Tower of Chartres," constitutes a fitting supplement to the main text.

The sub-title of the book discloses something of the author's plan and purpose, but these are fully revealed only gradually, until one may venture to characterize the work as an evaluation of the Gothic style in its early versions and in the context of a system of ideas presumed to have guided the creators of the new and wonderful kind of religious architecture. A number of churches are referred to briefly. Those singled out for fuller treatment are St. Denis, the first Gothic abbey; Sens, the first Gothic cathedral; and Chartres, which commands the place of honor in the concluding chapters as the culmination of the style initiated at St. Denis. As for the system of ideas credited by the author with inspiring the invention of Gothic, this consists of two themes inter-related by an encompassing conception of the sanctuary as a symbol or model of the universe, anagogically giving intimations of ineffable truth, so that mystically and liturgically it is an image of Heaven. The themes which converge in this vision of its meaning are, first, the Pythagorean-Platonic glorification of number, with the attendant ideal of harmonic proportion; and secondly, the glorification of light inaugurated by Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite.

In the treatment of writings that developed the first of the themes, we encounter St. Augustine's *De Musica* and the treatise on music by Boethius. According to Augustine, music is the mathematical science of good modulation based on the "perfect" ratios of Pythagorean mysticism, 1:2, 2:3, and 3:4 which produce the consonances of octave fifth, and fourth. But number is the source of all aesthetic perfection, for those musical harmonies may be experienced visually no less than acoustically, as was exemplified by Boethius when he pointed out that the number of surfaces, angles, and edges of a cube are 6:8:12, dupli-

cating the ratios of the octave, fifth, and fourth. Thus architecture may be affiliated with music, "since both are children of number," the one mirroring eternal harmony, the other echoing it. A similar significance was later attributed to the Temple of Solomon by Abelard, who noted that its proportions "were those of musical consonance, and that it was this 'symphonic' perfection that made it an image of Heaven." Many other medieval thinkers elaborated upon Augustine's philosophy, especially those at Citeaux and Clairvaux under the leadership of St. Bernard, and at the Cathedral School of Chartres, where, it has been said, the Platonists were so obsessed with mathematics that they seemed to be attempting a transformation of theology into geometry.

With regard to the second of the themes under consideration, the homage paid to light, we are told that medieval thinkers set luminosity beside harmonic proportion as the essence of the beautiful. Dionysius had proclaimed the glory of radiance in a blend of Neoplatonism and the theology of light in the Gospel of St. John. But it was Dante who, in the poetry of the Paradiso, gave the most sublime rendering of the medieval metaphysics of light. If that metaphysics played any part in the originating of Gothic architecture, it would obviously have been in the way of calling for fuller illumination of the sanctuary. And if the Pythagorean-Platonic exalting of number gave guidance to Gothic architects, this would have been in the way of determining the design of churches in terms of the perfect ratios. The question is whether a real case can be made out for the validity of either of these hypotheses.

Surprisingly the author suddenly expresses his own doubts. "How much can be actually ascertained" he asks, "regarding the direct influence of the intellectual and spiritual movements we have studied . . . upon the creation of Gothic architecture? The question can only be answered with varying degrees of assurance." But he had already triumphantly announced: "Gothic art would not have come into existence without the Platonic cosmology cultivated at Chartres and without the spiritualism of Clairvaux." And later on, discussing Suger's participation in the planning of St. Denis, he expresses further certainty. Suger, whose rose window was the first to be set in the west front of a church, was, we are told, himself the first "to conceive

the architectural system as but a frame for his windows, and to conceive his windows not as wall openings but as translucent surfaces to be adorned with sacred paintings. This dual invention distinguished Suger's style from Romanesque, and is indeed the basic novelty of Gothic architecture." We are thereupon assured: "The Dionysian source of this artistic revolution can no longer be doubted".

But stained glass antedated Gothic, and surely the enlarging and beautifying and multiplying of windows may be plausibly accounted for without resort to the desperate expedient of accrediting Dionysius with the innovation. Love of light and gorgeous colors was very widely shared by people then as it is now. Concern for insuring the stability of soaring walls covered by high vaults would have delayed the enlargement of openings in the solid stone to make way for fragile glass. It would have been surprising if, with the development of technical skills, the new windows had failed to appear, portraying miracles, sacraments and doctrines, the virtues and sins of Christian ethics, and great figures of prophets, apostles, saints, and martyrs. Since what is pictured includes the winged beings of the angelic hierarchy, Dionysius merits inclusion in the book, if only for his adorning of the theme of the nine orders of angels—a theme that was to receive culminating expression in the *Divine Comedy,* and the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, all the other writers dealt with have a rightful place here because of their enrichment of the religious outlook of medieval people who worshiped in Gothic churches.

As for the supposed influence of the mystic cult of numbers upon the designers of churches, the statement that "Gothic architecture was conceived and defined as applied geometry" tells us nothing, for what place of worship since the days of ancient Egypt is not similarly definable? Of course the reply, whether true or false, would have to be that it is only, or almost only, Gothic churches that are proportioned in terms of the harmonic ratios. But what do we find here? No reference to those ratios in the detailed analysis of St. Denis, the church that established the Gothic style. Passing on to the cathedral of Sens, von Simson observes that "the octave ratio of 1:2 permeates the entire edifice," demonstrating this by reference to the width and height of the nave in comparison with the dimensions of the aisles, and the height of the nave with that of the nave arcade. Again the 1:2 ratio

confronts us in the west front of Chartres, but with it the "golden section" proportion, which is exemplified in any rectangle whose short side is to the long as the long is to the sum of the two. The proportion recurs in both the elevation and the ground plan. It is, we are told, because the ground plan conforms to the golden section proportion that the cathedral "has the compact cohesiveness of an organism."

Of course the harmonic ratios of Pythagorean mysticism did not include the golden section, and the octave ratio is, after all, only the simple and familiar proportion of a half to a whole. Strictly speaking, it would seem, only the written testimony of medieval architects that their plans for Gothic churches were the direct result of their reading the literature of the cult of numbers would suffice to prove the theory defended in the book.

For those keenly interested in medieval ecclesiastical history, the account of Suger's connections with St. Denis and great church leaders may be especially welcome. And, certainly, even those already familiar with the story of Chartres will be glad to find it retold here. It is a dramatic story of great conflagrations and a sequence of rebuildings of the sanctuary terminating in its complete Gothic incarnation. There is the mystery of the anonymity of its creation, the architect's name having passed into oblivion; and the puzzling fact that the west front with its magnificent sculpture escaped destruction in the terrible fire of 1194, so that it could become part of the thirteenth century cathedral and made even more beautiful by the addition of the rose window above the trinity of lancets.

The author had, at the very beginning, said that the decisive feature of Gothic "is not the cross-ribbed vault, the pointed arch or the flying buttress" and then proceeded to define the style as "transparent, diaphanous architecture," repeating the term *transparent* in later passages. Unfortunately the image this word brings to mind is of a modern sky-scraper lighted by huge rectangles of clear glass through which the outer scene is fully visible. But *diaphanous,* yes. For this evokes memories of a vast shadowy interior whose containing walls seem to have been in part transmuted into a film of iridescence letting in the light of the sun in hues of amber, emerald, sapphire, turquoise, ruby, amethyst, displayed in lancet and rose windows in aisles, chapels, transepts, apse, at the west end of the nave, and high above in the

clerestory. In their radiance and what they portray, they are indeed invested with, at the very least, the meanings attributed to them in this book.

HELEN HUSS PARKHURST

Barnard College

The Classics and Renaissance Thought. By PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER. (Martin Classical Lectures, Vol. XV) Published for Oberlin College by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1955. xiv, 106 pp. $2.50.

In these lectures Professor Kristeller has given a new perspective on the relation of Renaissance thought to the culture of the Ancient World. While it should be emphasized that this is "intellectual" history in the sense that he is chiefly concerned with the influence of books as revealed in books, at the same time this book is not without implications for a general concept of Renaissance culture. He examines the impact of classical thought in four aspects: (1) ancient literature and rhetoric, or "The Humanist Movement"; (2) "The Aristotelian Tradition"; (3) "Renaissance Platonism"; and (4) "Paganism and Christianity."

Professor Kristeller's method in each lecture is to clarify the complex and mixed nature of the antique tradition by sketching first the history of the particular intellectual tradition within the ancient world, itself, then its transformations in the three areas of the medieval world, through which culture was transmitted to the Renaissance—namely the Latin West, the Byzantine Empire, and Muslim Arab culture (with occasional glances at medieval Judaic culture). He is then in a position to present a more accurate picture of the operation of the particular classical tradition in the Renaissance itself, by indicating which phases of it, transmitted through and in turn colored by one or more of the medieval cultures, shaped Renaissance scholarly activities. He is also in a position to evaluate more soundly the Renaissance contribution to scholarship or to philosophical and religious thought by comparing it with previous activities.

He argues, in his first lecture, that the Renaissance "humanist" movement should be regarded as an almost exclusively scholarly and

professional phenomenon based on the practice of the *studia humanitatis,* equivalent to contemporary "humanities," including grammar, rhetoric, oratory, poetry, history, and moral philosophy. Too frequently "Renaissance Humanism" has been looked upon as a distinct chapter in the history of philosophy, or, on the other hand, confused with contemporary humanitarian and free-thinking movements that label themselves "humanist," presumably in contradistinction to "religious." Professor Kristeller finds the true center of Renaissance humanism in the reassertion (now in Italy) of the ancient rhetorical tradition which had its chief impact and was the principal classical influence on medieval Latin culture from the fifth through the twelfth centuries. In the eyes of the humanists they were reviving a true and exalted ancient tradition against the obscurity of late medieval scholastic philosophy, but in fact they were resuming an emphasis on studies that had flourished in the earlier Middle Ages and had been rivals of philosophy in the ancient world itself. The rhetorical tradition had been the dominant one in ancient Roman culture. For this reason the writings of Cicero were for long a major influence on Renaissance humanism.

The humanists were not original philosophers, nor were they original in their rhetorical interests, but their enthusiasm for ancient learning was such that, taking advantage of their close relations with Byzantium in the early fifteenth century, they recovered and translated into Latin almost the complete corpus of ancient Greek writings, many of which had been previously unknown in the West. The foundations of modern classical scholarship were laid by the humanists and this was their real importance.

Although Professor Kristeller recognizes that, despite their lack of originality, the humanist treatises in moral philosophy supplemented a weakness of contemporary scholasticism, it is my belief that some greater emphasis here could be placed on the importance of the revival of the rhetorical tradition itself, as it found expression in humanist orations and dialogues on ethical questions. These, it seems to me, were in part a response to an emotional need of middle class and courtly circles for exhortation and orientation on moral questions by laymen—a need which neither the technical discussions of university philosophers nor the emotional sermons of the Mendicants intended for the masses could meet.

In his lecture on the Aristotelian tradition, Professor Kristeller supplies a badly needed corrective of the notion that the Renaissance was anti-Aristotelian. Following his usual procedures, he shows how Aristotelianism itself was blended with Platonism by such philosophers as Proclus in late ancient times, how the Romans and the Latin medieval West were but slightly influenced by Aristotle until the translations from Arabic into Latin in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries laid the basis for scholastic philosophy. He emphasizes the variety of currents in the scholastic Aristotelian tradition, denying the central importance of Thomas Aquinas, and shows how the different schools of the scholastic Aristotle had their continuation and even new foundations in the Renaissance. Along side the older, he indicated two new approaches to Aristotle during the Renaissance. The first was the greater concern with the *Ethics,* the *Politics,* the *Rhetoric,* and the *Poetics* on the part of the humanist moral philosophers and rhetoricians—who, of course, had some influence on Aristotle studies through their new translations of him. The second was the development of new philosophical interpretations of Aristotle by figures such as Pomponazzi and Zabarella. This he believes was probably due to the entry of the Byzantine tradition of Aristotle studies into Italy in the fifteenth century. On the other hand, the anti-Aristotelianism of some of the humanists was mainly ill-founded, or directed against the rival discipline of philosophy. With the new scientific developments in mathematics, physics, and astronomy, Aristotle's status declined, but he more than held his own in medicine and biology.

Whereas it has been usual to think of the Renaissance as representing something of a revival of Platonism, Professor Kristeller, who is himself probably the leading student of Renaissance Platonism today, is concerned to show the mixed character of Platonism in the Renaissance. Marsilio Ficino, the most important of the Neoplatonists, was much influenced by Thomas Aquinas, an Aristotelian. Renaissance Neoplatonists generally made little distinction between Plato himself and his late antique followers. Professor Kristeller suggests that the modern emphasis on this distinction tends to play down the religious apects of Plato's thought, which were, of course, dominant in ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonism. However fused with other currents, the study of Plato in the Renaissance was of greater importance than it had been in the Latin west and in Arabic culture, perhaps because

humanist translators from the Greek added so immensely to the availability of his writings. Here again the Byzantine influence gets special mention. There also can be no doubt as to the great influence of Platonism on the political, scientific, and religious thought of this period.

Readers of this journal may find the final lecture on "Paganism and Christianity" of greatest interest, particularly since the Reformation is considered as not opposed to the Renaissance but "as an important development within the broader period." As for "paganism," Kristeller rejects the idea that the Renaissance either tried to revive ancient religious cults or was in any sense anti-Christian. What he does emphasize is "the irresistible growth of nonreligious interests which were not so much opposed to religious doctrine, as rather competing with it." Secularism had its beginnings in the Middle Ages and merely gained greater momentum in the Renaissance. At the same time, most kinds of medieval religious thought and practice continued to flourish during this period. Avoiding any discussion of the new theologies of Protestant and Catholic Reformations, he undertakes to show the impact of the humanist movement on these changes. Through their translations the humanists brought about an interest in the Greek Fathers, who were hardly at all studied in the West until this time. Also a tendency to regard the Latin Fathers as "classics" led to new readings and interpretations free from the older scholastic context. There also came a more accurate knowledge of church history and a concern for the purification of scriptural texts culminating in the various new translations of the Bible, both into Latin and the vernacular tongues. "If we try to assess the positive contributions of humanist scholarship to Renaissance theology, we must emphasize above all their achievements in what we might call sacred philology."

He does not believe that humanism meant a new and distinct religious movement, for there were humanists of nearly every school and sect. "Christian humanism" he limits to classical scholars who discussed religious problems. He includes only sixteenth century figures such as More, Erasmus, Budé, and Calvin (but not Luther). To my mind, such earlier figures as Petrarch, Salutati, Valla, Ficino, and even Pico, were also "Christian humanists." Besides their common interest in "sacred philology," they shared a desire to make a religious life

available to laymen and to open up religious questions for lay discussion.

This book is the harvest of years of productive scholarship in the fields of ancient and Renaissance learning. Professor Kristeller's version of the Renaissance is a sober and clarifying one. He slays few dragons but buries many illusions. Its reading is essential to anyone who wants to make sense out of this period. At the same time, it is an earnest plea on behalf of classical and historical studies to an age that seems tempted to forget that, like the Renaissance, its own culture is built out of traditions.

CHARLES TRINKAUS

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Justus Lipsius: The Philosophy of Renaissance Stoicism. By JASON LEWIS SAUNDERS. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955. xviii, 228 pp. $4.50.

Stoicism, because of its attempt to fortify man personally and internally against all the vicissitudes nature and society can inflict upon him, is a philosophy bound to be particularly attractive to rational men in an age as turbulent as our own. In adapting Stoicism for modern use, it is particularly instructive to consider how it has been adapted in other periods of great social tension. One such period was the late Renaissance—the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries—a period torn by ideological warfare as bitter as that which upsets the contemporary world. This book presents us with a study of the Stoicism of this period as it was interpreted by Justus Lipsius, the Flemish philologist, historian, and classicist, who was, by all standards, one of the most prominent scholars of that day.

Mr. Saunders divides his study into two parts: a short account of the life and principal writings of Lipsius, and an extended analysis of Lipsius' interpretation of Stoic thought. This analysis is, in turn, subdivided into a study of Lipsius' view of Stoic ethical theory, and an even more extensive study of his view of Stoic physical theory. It is Mr. Saunders' contention that an understanding of Stoic physics is essential for an understanding of Stoic ethics, since this ethic is basically an appeal for a life lived in accordance with nature, and nature's

essence must therefore be discovered before this program can be put into effect. Lipsius' recognition and exposition of this central fact is, Mr. Saunders believes, his greatest contribution to the development of modern Neo-Stoicism. The argument is convincing, but disappointing. Stoic physical theory seems so antiquated that few today would use it as a guide for behavior. About all that remains is the principle that nature should guide life.

In developing his study of Lipsius' Stoicism, Mr. Saunders depends largely on a very careful analysis of two major works, the *Manuductio* and the *Physiologia*. He discovers in them, not only a sure knowledge of classic Stoic authors and a synthesis of their doctrines with classic Christianity as expressed by the Fathers of the Church, but also, surprisingly, a considerable Neo-Platonic and Gnostic influence. Mr. Saunders' own erudition is particularly impressive in his tracing of Lipsius' use of Stoic authors. He is able to correct and supplement the scholarly Lipsius in his interpretation of classical Stoic texts, in a significant number of minor instances.

It seems to this reviewer, however, that this erudition is too narrowly applied. The book's introduction makes it evident that the author views his monograph as a contribution to the broad and detailed survey of classical influences on Renaissance thought which has long occupied members of the Philosophy Department at Columbia University (where Mr. Saunders studied and, for a time, taught), and which has been particularly distinguished by the work of Mr. Kristeller. Yet one sees here little attempt to relate Lipsius' thought to that of other humanist philosophers of his century. One particularly misses any study of parallels between Lipsius' conclusions and those of such earlier Renaissance students of Stoicism as Erasmus and Calvin. As a result, the reader may get the impression that Lipsius was more unique than he was in fact. Perhaps Mr. Saunders will extend his future research to investigate some of these parallels.

This reviewer would also like to see Mr. Saunders push his researches, if possible, in yet another, more biographical direction. It is obvious from this study, that Lipsius had trouble in applying his Stoic philosophy to concrete situations. Religiously he played the part in turn of Catholic, Lutheran, Catholic, Calvinist, and again Catholic. At each stage he occasionally descended to polemics—virulently attacking papal power at one point, credulously describing popular miracles

at another. It is suggested that in his personal decisions, Lipsius was guided more by ambition and expediency than by lofty ideals. Could we find out more of what it was that kept this foremost exponent of Stoic philosophy from exhibiting more Stoic constancy and fortitude in his own life? If even the philosopher's life is governed more by circumstance than by principle, what can ordinary men do?

ROBERT M. KINGDON

University of Massachusetts

The Mennonite Encyclopedia: A Comprehensive Reference Work on the Anabaptist-Mennonite Movement. Editor, HAROLD S. BENDER; Assistant Editor, CORNELIUS KRAHN. Vol. I (A-C). Mennonite Publishing House, Scottdale, Pa., together with Mennonite Publishing Office, Newton, Kansas, and Mennonite Brethren Publishing House, Hillsboro, Kansas, 1955. xvi, 750 and 47 pp. appendix and 41 pp. half tones. $10.00.

This is the first volume of a monumental undertaking by a denomination which, in comparison with the better known church bodies of America, must be considered rather small. There are about 140,000 Mennonites in USA, 80,000 in Canada, and, together with their brethren in Europe and South America, the Church comprises hardly more than 325,000 "ethnic" Mennonites plus some 50,000 converts in the different mission fields. And yet here we have before us a 800 page large folio volume of a comprehensive Encyclopedia covering only the items of the first three letters of the alphabet. The entire undertaking is estimated to be finished in four volumes (by 1958) plus a supplementary volume to come covering results of new research. Certainly an amazing plan of great vision.

Its justification, however, lies deeper than merely denominational history. What today is called Mennonitism (and one should keep in mind that there is not one "Mennonite Church" but only an affiliation of round twenty different church bodies of that name, co-operating in the present enterprise) is actually a late descendant of sixteenth century Anabaptism, that great movement which so deeply challenged the Protestant world of its day and now is often called the "Left-Wing" of the Reformation. Formerly, church historians treated Anabaptism in a rather marginal fashion, disposing of it with the conventional

term "fanaticism" (*Schwärmerei*). Not too much was known as to sources, inner developments, theology, and general meaning within the historical process. All that has changed profoundly in the last thirty or forty years. Around 1913, two dedicated German Mennonite scholars, Christian Neff and Christian Hege, set out, almost single-handed and without financial background, to bring more light into this great heritage of their Church and to publish a reference work known as *Mennonitisches Lexikon.* Today, 1957, it is still not yet complete, having arrived at letter "Re" of volume III. But even in this shape, the *Lexikon* has proved an invaluable tool for any research in this area. It is comprehensive and, as far as possible, reliable. The completion of the work might still take several years, considering the lack of funds and, above all, of scholarly workers in this field.

Around 1948, the noted American Mennonite scholar, Harold S. Bender, Dean of the Mennonite Biblical Seminary at Goshen College, Goshen, Ind., together with the late C. Henry Smith, another well known Mennonite historian, decided upon an English edition of this *Lexikon,* planning at first nothing but a translation of the revised German text plus some additions as to the American scene. Nobody had then the faintest idea what they had embarked upon. The work grew by leaps and bounds, and it became obvious that, at best, perhaps only one third of the German text would still be usable. All the rest had to be written anew on ground of latest research and information, using often remote or never before noticed sources, and formulating problems and taking positions not dealt with previously in historical research. Thus the work grew ever more in scope but slowed down a final accomplishment. Today, the small editorial staff is proud to present the first volume, a real mine of information for all research in the Left-Wing of the Reformation and more recent church history.

To the Mennonites of today, it contains exhaustive articles on churches and personalities of all the countries involved; to the historian it deals not only with anything belonging to the Anabaptists, even if distantly related, but also with issues somehow connected with this basic movement, as e.g., Anti-Trinitarianism, Counter-Reformation, Church of the Brethren, Bohemian Brethren, Sebastian Franck's "Chronica", etc. Not only Germany, Switzerland, and the USA are treated most thoroughly (editor H. S. Bender), but also Holland, the home of the Doopsgezinde (here N. van der Zijp, Rotterdam, is one

of the most prolific and reliable contributors), and Russia, the home of the formerly Prussian Mennonites (in the main taken care of by the assistant editor, Cornelius Krahn). This reviewer has likewise co-operated in this enterprise by contributing about 45 articles (in the first volume) concerned with the history and thought of the Hutterite Brethren and Austrian church history in general.

A few articles might deserve particular mention. Foremost is the excellent study by Harold S. Bender on the idea of "Church" as understood by the Anabaptist-Mennonites. Here new ground is broken as to principles and self-interpretation, and no discussions on free-church issues may henceforth by-pass this classical essay. Likewise most valuable is W. Wiswedel's basic study, "Bible, inner and outer word" (i.e., spiritualism vs. literalism in old Anabaptism), a condensation of the author's more elaborate recent papers in the *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* and *Mennonite Quarterly Review*. Another article of general interest, "Anabaptist" (by H. S. Bender and the present writer) deals with the concept basic to the entire area, trying to clarify meaning and usage of this much misunderstood term (compare the author's study in *Church History,* 1940, and more recently, 1955). An article on "Architecture" and one on "Art" open new fields of research hitherto badly overlooked. Most valuable of all is the Appendix of 41 half-tone plates reproducing hitherto unknown or very little known pictures and views; 12 pages, architecture; 8 pages, Mennonite themes in art and Mennonite artists, illustrating the respective articles in the main text; 2 pages, Hutterite ceramics, so little noticed as yet; 7 pages, costumes, old and new, traditional among the brethren; and one page with portraits belonging to volume I. Throughout the text well-drawn maps show historic locations and places of mission fields.

Volume II, now in print, will cover the letters D to H; volume III (manuscript now at the press) is to cover letters I to N; while volume IV (scheduled for 1958) should cover O to Z, unless the material becomes too abundant for one volume. The amount of new information thus gained is amazing and will prove invaluable to church historians. Needless to say that absolute scholarly strictness is practiced at all times. The enterprise proves beyond doubt that Anabaptism-Mennonitism is by far more than a small denominational side line to the main stream of Protestantism. From 1525, when the movement began in Zürich, Switzerland, up to the present, there is visible this rather

strong current of "free-church" or "gathered" (believers') church testimony, possible only where Christianity is taken with the absolute earnestness of (at least attempted) discipleship of Christ. The ideas of liberty of conscience and of separation of state and church had their origin, to a great extent, in this current of (evangelical) Anabaptism and later (renamed) Mennonitism. Many a controversial issue and many a church historical category are still to be clarified, but with a tool such as this *Mennonite Encyclopedia* on hand, it should prove by far easier than before. The editorial staff is to be congratulated to this enormous achievement, a work of love, to be sure, executed with greatest exactitude. The Publishing Committee also deserves a word of praise for the excellent production of the book, paper, print, illustration, and binding. The price ($10.00) is low enough to enable wider circles to purchase a reference work of this kind. Critical remarks, however, due in any case, shall be postponed until volume two will be reviewed.

ROBERT FRIEDMAN

Western Michigan College

Milton and Forbidden Knowledge. By HOWARD SCHULTZ. New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1955. vii, 309 pp. $5.00.

This study confronts a central problem in Milton's thought arising out of the apparently derogatory attitude toward human learning manifested in some of his late works, and supplies a plausible new hypothesis to explain the difficulty.

The problem is posed most clearly in *Paradise Regained,* which deals, as the reader will remember, with the biblical story of Christ's temptation by and victory over Satan in the desert. In this "brief epic" Milton inserted, in climactic position, a lengthy "temptation by learning" unknown alike to the biblical text and to previous interpretations of that text. In response to this temptation, Milton's Christ asserts that Scripture is fully sufficient to supply all knowledge, and sharply repudiates classical philosophy, rhetoric, and politics; he even includes classical poetry in the denunciation, describing it as "Thin sown with aught of profit or delight." (*PR,* IV, 345). Such a caustic, sweeping, and apparently gratuitous repudiation of the learning of the ancients is difficult to account for from the Christian humanist

whose *Areopagitica* is the most eloquent defense of intellectual liberty in our language, and whose own poetry is so constantly and so deeply indebted to classical thought and poetic example.

Milton scholarship to date has offered two kinds of comment respecting this difficulty. One group of critics denies the existence of a real problem, interpreting this passage and others of similar tenor in such a way as to place them within the general tradition of Christian humanism. A second group finds the passage so completely at odds with that tradition that they can account for it only by positing a radically changed Milton—a Milton who, profoundly discouraged by his blindness and by the failure of the Puritan cause, has rejected the goods of the natural order, including human learning, and has adopted a Quaker-like belief in the direct illumination of the Spirit. Some find further indications of this new attitude in his prose tracts of 1659-1660, and in the passage on curiosity in *Paradise Lost.*

Mr. Schultz suggests a third interpretation. He argues that all of Milton's statements regarding learning, except those in *Paradise Regained,* can be related to the broad tradition defined by Christian humanism; he declares further that even the *Paradise Regained* passage does not necessitate the assumption of a Milton gone over to Quakerism or "pietism." Rather, he suggests a new context for interpreting these difficult lines, and indeed the entire poem, arguing that Christ, in this work, is not conceived primarily as model for the individual Christian, but rather is portrayed as head of the Church and model for its ministers. Thus the poem is not directly concerned with the individual Christian's relation to the natural order and its learning, but rather with that of the Church, which, as a wholly spiritual institution, must deny all necessary reliance upon worldly goods, even the highest of them.

This study endeavors to supply the necessary background for interpreting Milton's views through an extensive investigation of contemporary attitudes and controversies regarding learning; in so doing, the work makes a significant contribution to the history of ideas in the seventeenth century as well as to Milton scholarship. One range of discussion throws into relief the contemporary humanist criticism both of the new science and of the old philosophy, based primarily upon the concept that the most valuable learning is that which is conducive to self-knowledge and right conduct. According to this

criterion, certain scientific speculations (for which astronomy came to be a symbol) were frequently labelled mere "curiosity" because unrelated to the immediate concerns of man, and the metaphysical and ethical teachings of the classical philosophers, as well as of the scholastics, were often declared to be vain and false because supplanted by the Bible. Of interest also is the lengthy discussion in this work of the attitudes toward reason and learning growing out of various doctrinal positions. Significantly, all shades of religious opinion assumed the necessity for humility and restraint of intellectual speculation, and interpreted the fall of man as somehow related to curiosity; of course every sect arrogated the virtue of intellectual modesty to itself and convicted its opponents of pride and intellectual sin. Also speaking for intellectual modesty, but upon different grounds, were the Cambridge Platonists, with their "latitudinarian" emphasis upon doctrines plain and clear to all, and their humanistic focus upon rationalist ethics and Christian morality. Finally, this study treats the impact of the "learning question" upon the Church as an institution; the issue here was the so-called "learned-ministry" controversy over what kind and how much (if indeed any) learning is necessary to the minister.

Although interesting in its own terms, much of the material concerning these controversies has no direct bearing upon problems in Milton, and this fact gives rise to one of the chief difficulties of presentation in the book. The focus is blurred; it is fixed neither upon Milton nor upon the intellectual history of the "learning question" in the seventeenth century, but instead moves back and forth in a rather disturbing fashion between these two interests. Such confusion of focus appears to be a common hazard in works dealing with a great figure and his milieu. Also, the self-consciously lively style sometimes misses fire and obscures the meaning; occasionally, too, it inclines to the pompous, as in the following phrase, "our celerity should be contempered with cunctation" (p. 57). Furthermore, the omission of footnote reference numbers in the text hinders efficient use of the notes collected at the back of the book.

But despite such annoyances regarding the presentation of material, the reader cannot but be impressed with some of the penetrating judgments concerning Milton's statements about learning and education which Professor Schultz offers. He relates Milton's attitudes in *Prolusions* and *Of Education* to the contemporary humanist disposi-

tion to value learning in terms of its "utility" for promoting self-knowledge and right conduct. He also offers a very satisfactory analysis of the Adam-Raphael discussion of astronomy in *Paradise Lost,* based upon the fact that astronomical speculation had become a commonplace humanist symbol for vain curiosity. Furthermore, his study of various doctrinal positions has enabled him to reassert (in opposition to certain recent estimates) that Milton remained a scripturalist and a rationalist in religion during his last years, that his doctrine of the Spirit was far removed from that of the Quakers and "enthusiastic" sectaries, and that his statements regarding Christ's Kingdom in this world had reference to the Church and not to some proposed Millenarian or Fifth Monarchist theocratic state.

However, the endeavor to right the balance for an essentially humanistic as opposed to a "pietistic" Milton seems at times to have led Mr. Schultz to overlook or to underemphasize certain real changes in Milton's thinking during the Interregnum. This is especially evident in his treatment of Milton's 1659-1660 tracts. He properly notes that Milton's pamphlet, *The Likeliest Means,* deals only with the issue of ministerial learning and therefore does not reflect a change in Milton's view of the uses of learning in the natural order, and also that Milton constantly manifests his expectation that ministers normally will have some kinds of learning. Nevertheless, Milton's views on clergy learning had undergone a certain change by 1659: *The Likeliest Means* does not merely criticize scholastic philosophy and university education (as Schultz's argument implies) but asserts categorically that no human learning is necessary to the minister. In contrast to this Milton had vigorously denounced an "ignorantly zealous divinity" in his tract, *Of Education* (1644). By the same token, while it is certainly true that Milton did not become a Millenarian in 1660, he was nevertheless forced by the threat of a Restoration to retreat somewhat from a humanistic view of political society, and to propose a government, not by the "Saints" as such, but yet a government primarily dedicated to the interests of the regenerate—the preservation of their religious liberty and personal safety.

But the most serious drawback in this study concerns the treatment of *Paradise Regained.* Professor Schultz offers a penetrating analysis of the "learning passage" in that poem, observing that, despite its many similarities to commonplaces of humanistic thought, it is

sharply differentiated by its tone and attitude from that approach. Also, his hypothesis that this passage, like the prose tract, *The Likeliest Means,* should be interpreted against the background of the learned-ministry controversy, with Christ conceived as a model for the Church rather than for the private Christian, is a plausible one. Mr. Schultz declares, however, that the whole poem must show itself susceptible of the ecclesiastical interpretation if this reading of the passage is to hold. Yet, doubtless because he wished to restrict his consideration to the learning issue, he fails to discuss the poem in sufficient detail to convince the reader that it can bear this interpretation throughout. The result is that the matter is finally unresolved; after painstaking investigation of comparatively minor issues and less significant Miltonic problems, the most important difficulty receives a comparatively slight and summary treatment. A footnote refers the reader to a previous article (Howard Schultz, "Christ and Antichrist in *Paradise Regained,*" *PMLA,* LXVII [1952], 790 ff.) which provides a more complete but still unsatisfactory analysis; this article fails to relate the distinctly personal and ethical aspects of the poem to the ecclesiastical interpretation suggested. A full investigation of the poem in the light of the issues raised by the present study ought to prove very rewarding. But, though such a study has not been provided here, one can be grateful to Professor Schultz for an illuminating account of attitudes toward learning in the seventeenth century, especially among Christian humanists, and for a provocative and attractive hypothesis about Milton.

Barbara Kiefer Lewalski

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Kierkegaard Commentary. By T. H. Croxall. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. xix, 263 pp. $5.00.

This is not, the author tells us at the outset, a book *about* Kierkegaard. It is rather designed to meet "the primary need for English readers of explaining, sorting out, and commenting upon *the actual words that Kierkegaard wrote.*" The method used is, therefore, quotation, paraphrase, running and cross-referenced commentary. One may judge that the author has done exceedingly well what he has undertaken to do without agreeing that this sort of book exactly meets the

need of the hour, or that serious readers may not understand Kierkegaard about as readily from the works themselves. Although chapters and books *about* Kierkegaard often proceed without first troubling to understand him, nevertheless, books about him are what we need—in which philosophers and theologians wrestle with him till daybreak, or in a fresh way with the issues he has made real to us. Perhaps, indeed, "the very superfluity of introductory works, that merely mark time at the threshold, is a danger to continued appreciation of Kierkegaard's achievements" (James Collins, *The Mind of Kierkegaard,* p. viii).

It cannot be denied that, at many points, T. H. Croxall (whose previous *Kierkegaard Studies* was published in 1948) illuminates mystification in the text or section titles or authorship of Kierkegaard's works beyond what may be gained from the translators' notes to the works themselves. But faced with the size and complexity within and in-between Kierkegaard's big books, the weary reader may expect too much from a commentary. Where there is inherent complexity, indeed, this may be made more difficult to comprehend by compressing it into smaller compass and eliminating the richness of the original style and illustration. There has to be on every one of Croxall's pages as many cross references, forward and backward in this book itself, and to the author's *Kierkegaard Studies* or elsewhere in Kierkegaard's corpus and to his life, as there are in the corresponding pages in the original works such references and explanations made by the translators or by the mental or marginal notes of any serious reader.

The first eleven chapters (or 163 pages) of this commentary deal with the aesthetic works ("aesthetic" because pseudonymous, even when religion is distantly in view). The "uncommitted" existence of the aesthetic life and the "committed" existence of the ethicist Judge William are reviewed by commentary upon every one of the sections of *Either/Or* and parts 1 and 2 of the *Stages* (the summary of "Guilty?"/"Not-Guilty?" does not come alive, and Frater Taciturnus' analysis of his own psychological experiment is omitted). Croxall makes a real contribution in the appreciative attention he gives (here and in his *Studies*) to Kierkegaard's essays on music, which have been little understood and scarcely approached by philosophers or music critics. Under the heading "Resumption," he makes the attempt, if unsuccessful, to secure a really adequate word to replace "repetition," in commenting on Kierkegaard's book by that name. "Border Con-

flicts" treats *Fear and Trembling,* and the reader is sent to *Studies* for supplement. In this reviewer's opinion, Croxall, like most religious writers, finds in the aesthetic stage too much *drang* toward the religious life, which Kierkegaard resisted in opposing "mediation." And I cannot believe that the Quidam of the Diary should be bracketed with "A" who wrote *Either/Or,* with the young man who speaks first in the Banquet and with the young man in *Repetition,* in marshalling the pseudonyms. The reader must turn to *Studies* for Croxall's understanding of the *Concept of Dread* and *Sickness unto Death.*

The last seven chapters (or 89 pages) deal with religious existence, in two chapters on "Christ, Socrates, and Hegel," and one each on the subjects religion-in-general, facets of Christology, works, authority, and the attack on Christendom. The *Fragments* comes most into play, and commentary on the *Postscript* (except for Kierkegaard's review of his authorship in that work) is promised for a later time. Readers generally will especially appreciate the publication, for the first time *in extenso,* of Martensen's reply to Kierkegaard's attack; and Croxall's location of the importance of *The Works of Love,* Kierkegaard's first sizable work called "Christian," as laying the groundwork for the only proper Christian social ethic. Kierkegaard himself remarked that, because of his "maieutic acumen in going forward slowly, and always appearing as though I knew nothing more, not even the next thing," there had arisen "an uproar [still going on in books *about* Kierkegaard] to the effect that I do not know the next thing; that I know nothing about social relationships. Fools! . . . Now I have the theme of my next book. It shall be called *Works of Love.*"

Throughout this volume, from the first footnote onward, Croxall campaigns for new translations of Kierkegaard's works, and he makes his own translation of passages used. "It is a pity that so much of *Either/Or,* vol. 1, is so badly translated," he writes; and he says that the last part of the *Stages* in English is practically useless. Lowrie, Dru, and both Swensons come under attack; Steere is praised. Now, Lowrie and Swenson expressed their awareness that it "might require the cooperation of many scholars during several generations before the translation of Kierkegaard's terminology could be definitely settled" (*Postscript,* p. ix). Certainly, some of Croxall's attempts are suggestive to the reader who knows no Danish, e.g., "actual, daily life" for "reality," the aesthetic "value" for the "validity" of marriage, and

"by the authority of the absurd" for "in virtue of." Yet I am told by a student of the Danish that his translations are often not so good as "the extant translations." I mention this not to prejudice the reader, for I myself have not the competence to say, but to put him on notice, if he was apt to think so, that the latest *may* not be the best. Unlike the case of Kant, who wrote in German, there may not be enough scholars in the case of Kierkegaard to produce the co-operation necessary to improve the translations in such a way that the average reader can unquestionably count upon them. The test will be made when Croxall, and others, make fresh translations of entire works and submit them for publication to houses who, in turn, submit them to assessment by other translators. For the record, the new translations in this commentary, or any other general book on Kierkegaard, have likely not been subjected to such a check.

PAUL RAMSEY

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The Decline and Revival of the Social Gospel: Social and Political Liberalism in American Protestant Churches, 1920-1940. By PAUL A. CARTER. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956. x, 265 pp. $3.75.

In the concluding chapter of the work under review the author raises the question as to whether or not one is justified in using the term "Social Gospel" in anything but the past tense as a designation for that particular species of social awareness which emerged in certain American denominations in the three or four decades preceding World War I. As the title of this book indicates, Mr. Carter believes that "there were and are continuities between the 'old' and 'new' social creeds" which warrant continued use of the term, yet I think it can be said that the major impression left by this excellent study is that its own title is deceiving. The "old" Social Gospel did not decline and then revive; it almost (but not quite) totally disappeared, only to have its place taken by something substantially new and different. One of the chief values of this book, indeed, is its convincing revelation of the vast chasm which separates men such as Washington Gladden and Reinhold Niebuhr. The "continuities" are unimpressive whether calculated in terms of dominant Church leaders or dominant

principles of thought, evaluation, and action. The only such continuity that is singled out for discussion is the fact that both "were in some sense the Church's response to the severe challenge of secularism"; but this is a fact so large, so pervasive, and so everlasting that it has little value.

The merits of this book rest on many other very tangible foundations, however. In the first place it is a well-documented account based on an immense amount of research among official Church pronouncements, in the files of the denominational press, and in the writings of the men concerned. Secondly, the grasp of social and political realities (national and international) indicates that Mr. Carter deserves full certification as a "mere historian" (his phrase, p. vi). Finally, the author's discussions of theology and Church history reveal that he has done far more than discuss these matters with students and faculty in the Union Theological Seminary refectory! Laymen and Churchmen alike have reason to be grateful for his lucid and insightful interpretation of twentieth-century theology and ecumenical activity. I know of no book treating the general problem of Christian social action in America which shows so satisfactory an understanding of both secular history and the nature of the Church.

The basic approach to the problem is, as the title indicates, chronological, though in each of the periods studied there are various topical chapters. Part One, on "The Background of the Social Gospel in America," contains two chapters, one a very rapid survey of "Social Christianity" through World War I, the second an analysis of the situation in 1920. In this presentation of what is, so to speak, the starting point of the volume, the reader may well be surprised (as I was) at the degree to which the Social Gospel was still intact at this time. Almost as remarkable is the extent to which its main voices (institutional and personal) had as yet been untouched by the meaning of the War or become aware of the newly operative forces in American life.

Part II, "The Social Gospel under Fire, 1920-1929," consists of five chapters devoted respectively to Prohibition, Fundamentalism, the Church and business, "The Changing Ministry," and "The Impact of Secularism and War." Taken together these chapters tell a sad and uninspiring story. In the face of encroaching secularism the Church was "busily engaged in creating nominal members," while it increas-

ingly adjusted itself to the status quo, took over the value-system of the business-world, and witnessed the continuing decline of its influence. It is made very clear that the decade was not only, as he says, a "Time of Troubles" for the Social Gospel but for the Church at large.

Part III consists of two chapters devoted to the ecumenical movement, the first of these being a brief historical résumé of the rise of the Life and Work and the Faith and Order movements, and an account of how elements of American social Christianity "passed institutionally into the larger stream of world Christendom." The second chapter discusses the reverse process, how European movements, particularly those which found voice in the conferences on Faith and Order, subjected American attitudes to criticism and how the Social Gospel, by its adoption of ecumenicalism, adopted Faith and Order, thereby transforming itself. As a result of this interaction, Carter shows, "social gospelers began to stress the importance of the Church itself as an agent of reform." Thereby was restored "what Rauschenbusch Kingdom-theology had tended to blur: the distinction between church and world."

Part IV begins with an excellent survey of the Social Gospel "Legacy" as it was in 1929. The extent to which the movement had lost force and creative vitality becomes apparent. This is followed by a chapter on the "Preparation" for the revival of social Christianity provided by the chastisements of the Great Depression. This section concludes with an account of the "Impact: The Hundred Days and Afterward." Needless to say, these pages also describe some major transformations of Christian social attitudes as well as the creation of new denominational agencies to implement social action. The most important aspect of this change, however, was not the simple recognition of changed conditions in the nation and hence the advocacy and support of various government-sponsored measures. Of greater significance in the long run was the impact of the critique of American liberalism and social theology stemming from Karl Barth and other Continental thinkers. Later, and central to the story this book tells, came the synthesis of " 'crisis-theology' with the American social concern." Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932) is seen as the "bombshell" which gave a sudden forward surge to this movement and, in this chapter, as well as elsewhere, considerable

attention is given to the development of Niebuhr's dialectical realism, his gradual abandonment of Marxist premises, and his departure from pacifism.

Part Five, on "The Church, the World, and the Faith," in three chapters sets the revived "Social Gospel" in a larger perspective. The first of these recounts the progress of the ecumenical movement down to Amsterdam in 1948 and indicates the increased participation by American churches. Also noted is the process of denominational consolidation and merger in the United States, including the problems of integrating the Negro in various churches. The second chapter deals with the "Social Gospel" facing the crisis of World War II, the conflicts over pacifism, and the response of the Church to war. Of great value are the distinctions made and the contrasts drawn between the Church's attitudes in the First and Second World Wars. Looking to the future in the final chapter, Mr. Carter sees promise in the wariness of Church leaders to absolutize the present order or any given mode of improving it, as well as in their broadened international and social horizons. He is worried, nonetheless, about the "narrow appeal" of dialectical theology and the difficulty of communicating it on a popular basis "without simplifying it into Fundamentalism." He does not express what seems to me the equal or greater danger of its being simplified into a pessimistic and empty Neo-Modernism.

Certain of Mr. Carter's interpretations merit special emphasis. Perhaps first in this regard is the properly close attention that he has given to the inter-relation of American social Christianity and the ecumenical movement. That the older Social Gospel had fostered much inter-church co-operation and through a Life and Work emphasis had fostered much effective ecumenical organization is generally recognized. What is less appreciated is the manner in which European theological criticism of this-worldly Kingdom-building and the profound influence of Faith and Order served to deepen and virtually transform the Church's attitude to the world and its social problems. To use the author's term, "high-church" attitudes were brought to the fore even in what had been the most pronouncedly "free-church" denominations.

Also of great value to the understanding of twentieth-century American Christianity are the interpretations of the Prohibition movement and pacifism that are here given. By tracing the "genuine social-wel-

fare temper" that pervaded the early temperance movement and the Prohibition Party and noting that even as late as 1932 Upton Sinclair wrote his *The Wet Parade,* Mr. Carter is able to clarify the way in which the movement was transformed. He shows, too, how "The struggle for Prohibition was between town and country, and in that sense a last Bryanite rally of the West and South against the urban East." He also points to the tragic implications of its crowning success coming just as the nation's center of gravity was shifting to the city. It was perhaps this very fact that accounts for the way in which this Cause became, in so many circles, a "surrogate for the Social Gospel" and why, in the long run, so many "dry" leaders failed to appreciate the degree to which their stand was advancing the secularism of the rising generation. As for pacifism, Mr. Carter has done a service by showing how its religious manifestations were frequently paralleled by secular attitudes of international indifference, active isolationism and the closely correlated demands for America first and business first. Equally important, however, is the full information here so lucidly given on the exceedingly important role that pacifism played in the thought of "social gospelers" between 1920 and 1940.

Less satisfactory is the chapter on "The Social Meaning of Fundamentalism." The author admits that his "semi-Marxist" explanation can not be pressed too far, but it seems to me that the economic and social factors which he does stress in this case complicate rather than simplify the problem. Mr. Carter succeeds, really, in explaining only what he calls the "backwash" of Fundamentalism that flowed into nativist, isolationist, and even Fascist channels. There is, of course, no reason to doubt that the entire complex of Fundamentalist attitudes, like all other phenomena in human history, can be correlated with material, mundane factors. I am not arguing for a "spiritual" or "idealistic" interpretation of history. Yet the fact remains that the effort to find *simple* "social sources" of Fundamentalism has never been satisfactory, whether it be a rural-urban, a sectional, or a social-class diagnosis that is attempted. Perhaps the socio-psychological search for personality-types can yield significant results (though it will require far more sophistication than went into, say, *The Authoritarian Personality*). Prior to such analysis, in any case, there must be a recognition that Fundamentalism was (and is) not one thing but several. Each of these must be studied separately, just as J. Gresham Machen

and William Bell Riley require separate biographies; otherwise the significance of unique power relationships and personal antagonisms is lost. Finally the separate denominational traditions themselves must be examined, for prevailing attitudes toward the Church, the Bible, and dogma opened or closed certain avenues leading toward the acceptance of scientific and historical pursuits, created specific anxieties, and virtually predestined some types of conflict or conciliation. In short there are historical-particular, theological, and ecclesiological dimensions to the Fundamentalist Controversy that are obscured by Professor Carter's analysis.

In general, however, it must be enthusiastically recorded that this study obscures little and illuminates much. The felicitous style and fine organization of the work disguise completely its origins as a Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation. The book is indexed and adequately though not luxuriantly footnoted. A useful but unannotated bibliography is included. The author teaches history at the University of Maryland.

Sydney E. Ahlstrom

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The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry: Reflections on the Aims of Theological Education. By H. Richard Niebuhr, in collaboration with Daniel Day Williams and James M. Gustafson. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. xvi, 134 pp. $2.50.

The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry is the first fruit of a study of theological education in the United States and Canada conducted by H. Richard Niebuhr, Daniel Day Williams, and James M. Gustafson. Over one hundred Protestant seminaries participated in the "self-examination," which was carried out under the leadership of the American Association of Theological Schools and with the financial support of the Carnegie Corporation. In this compact, thoughtful volume Professor Niebuhr (in collaboration with his associates) draws some important generalizations out of the mass of particulars. But what gives this little book its power and insight is not so much the breadth of its base as the depth of its author's theological understanding. For these are above all else theological reflections, or reflections based on theological thinking primarily. Often only the

high points of the underlying structure show, leaving the reader wishing he could explore further the foundations beneath.

Believing that the seminaries cannot be understood apart from their primary context, Niebuhr has devoted the first movement of the work, not to the denomination or the nation, but to "the Church in its wholeness." He asks, what is the Church, and what is its purpose? Though there is full awareness of the complexity and pluralism of American religious life, a definition of the Church is nevertheless proposed. Employing the method of polar analysis, the author suggests that the Church is the subjective pole of the objective rule of God, it is both community and institution, it is one but many, local and universal, protestant and catholic, both partner and enemy of the world. To state "the ultimate objective of the whole Church and of the seminaries in the Church" is a complex business, especially in view of certain long-ranging debates about it: the individual emphasis versus the social, the Bible-centered view as against the Church-centered, the evangelistic approach or that of the proclamation of the Lordship of Christ. But the issue is not dodged; complexity does not deter conclusion.

> Is not the result of all these debates and the content of the confessions or commandments of all these authorities this: that no substitute can be found for the definition of the goal of the Church as the *increase among men of the love of God and neighbor*? The terms vary; now the symbolic phrase is reconciliation to God and man, now increase of gratitude for the forgiveness of sin, now the realization of the kingdom or the coming of the spirit, now the acceptance of the gospel" (p. 31).

The proposition is supported by compact and stimulating theological discussion predicated on the trinitarian nature of "the Mystery behind the mystery of human existence." The chapter closes on a radically prophetic note: the confusion of proximate goals (Church, Bible, and *Christ*) with the ultimate goal is indicated.

The second part of the volume considers the emerging new conception of the ministry. The ideas of the minister as pastoral ruler, as priest, as preacher, as evangelist—ideas which have ruled in various parts of the Church at various times—are now giving away to the concept of the minister as "pastoral director." "His first function is that of building or 'edifying' the church; he is concerned in everything that he does to bring into being a people of God who as a Church will

serve the purpose of the Church in the local community and the world" (p. 82). In this chapter, sociology marches hand in hand with theology to shed much new light on a confused area. In the twentieth century, administration is a major reality and authority a key problem in unexpected new ways in both church and world, and it is emphasized that the seminaries had better come to terms with them in fresh approaches.

The third movement of what I believe will become a classic work in the field of theological education deals with the idea of a theological school. First impressions given by theological schools are often those of multiplicity and indefiniteness of purpose, or inertia and conservatism, so Niebuhr finds. Unifying conceptions seem lacking; the resulting confusions in seminary affairs are many. Yet there are new currents of vitality flowing, stemming from "fervent convictions . . . about the greatness of the common Christian cause." These new currents, however, are not yet flowing evenly enough or in a sufficiently general direction to forward a clear idea of what a theological school ought to be. So the book expresses a hope: ". . . if a common sense of Church is nascent among the many members of one body and if a relatively clear idea is emerging of the *one* service to be rendered by ministers in their many duties, then some common idea of a theological school ought also to be possible" (p. 106). The book closes with a sustained effort to bring that hope closer to fulfillment. The theological school, as center of the Church's intellectual activity, is the place where the Church exercises its intellectual love of God and neighbor; it is also the place where the other activities of the Church are served through the exercise of theoretical understanding.

This is an unusual book, one that is bound to excite much discussion. It is of course written from "inside" the Protestant tradition—those who do not share the main premises of the author may find much of it abstract or irrelevant. It is theological and reflective—those who seek a profile of American Protestant seminaries or attention to specific problems had better wait for later volumes and reports from the same study. Indeed, the book anticipates what may be the chief criticism of it: "These adumbrations of the idea of a theological school will seem to some who have followed the course of our argument to be so general or so Utopian as to be irrelevant to the existing semi-

naries in the United States and Canada" (p. 133). But the book proceeds from, and points again to, "the concrete reality of life," and in its course succeeds brilliantly in illuminating the complex and extensive world of the Church and its seminaries. It is, perhaps, somewhat uneven in tone and vigor, but now and again it is simply superb as it blends force and clarity, insight and depth, emotion and restraint, in masterful theological writing.

ROBERT T. HANDY

Union Theological Seminary

Religion in Crisis and Custom. By ANTON T. BOISEN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. xv, 271 pp. $4.00.

For many years Dr. Boisen has held the conviction that careful observation and analysis required by the sciences have a contribution to make to the understanding of religion. He has felt that the findings of psychology and psychiatry would throw light on the nature of religious experience, and he has also felt that the methodology of science should be applied to the study of religion. He has made a great contribution as one of the founders of the movement for clinical pastoral training and has himself been an avid student of human personality as well as a pastor to persons in his service for nearly twenty-five years as Chaplain of the State Hospital at Elgin, Illinois. Coupled with this, he has had an alert interest in the rise, growth, and decline of religious institutions, of sects, and of organized churches. During his lifetime he has had unusual opportunities for careful observation and analytic study of such diverse groups as the churches of a small settled village and the Holy Rollers and other Pentecostal sects.

Religion in Crisis and Custom is in a sense the culmination of this long period of observation and study of persons and of institutions. He has given the book the sub-title, *A sociological and psychological study*, and has brought together a wealth of data which will bear much further analysis and interpretation. He presents his data mainly as illustrative, for he is constantly seeking for patterns of development and for cause and effect relationships. He has come to certain conclusions about religious experience which appear here as theses to be elaborated and defended. The examination of these hypotheses and

the rich material from personal and social life which accompanies their presentation combine to make the book interesting and challenging. Readers will find themselves stimulated to agree or disagree with Boisen's assumptions and interpretations, and to seek to formulate adequate reasons for such disagreement as they may feel.

The central thesis of the book, which accounts for its title, is based on the concept that life is an alternation between moments or periods of crisis and times of routine, habitual behavior. At times we respond to crisis, at other times we follow custom. This analysis has peculiar significance for religion, since religious experience "arises spontaneously under the pressure of crisis situations." At such moments "one stands face to face with the ultimate realities of life and death," and new insights and meanings appear, new purposes are born. These may well be mystical experiences, accompanied by a deep sense of identification with God, or of close communion with Him.

The central thesis moves then from the experience of individuals to that of larger social units. Religious experience "is rooted in the social nature of man," and just as the moments of critical upheaval or decision may issue in the experience of high exaltation or deep insight for the individual, so the religious quickening of a people will be found to grow out of a period of social crisis. This is especially true of times of economic crisis, which furnish the most productive soil from which the Holy Rollers and other sect movements arise.

The statement of the hypothesis is completed by noting that such highly creative periods are followed by a settling down to less creative routine. Sects tend to lose their fire, to become more conservative than creative, and to become organized churches, with greater emphasis on stated beliefs and orderly procedures. Another time of social crisis will then produce another upheaval and another period of religious quickening.

In developing the crisis theory on the personal side, Dr. Boisen draws quite naturally upon the observations of a psychotherapist and upon the experiences of the mentally ill. He states with some emphasis his conviction that mental illness may be the precise form which the personal crisis takes, and that it may be the path one must take to a positive resolution of his conflict and an entrance into new life. But there is also a great deal of material offered in evidence from the lives of such men as George Fox and John Wesley. Data to illustrate

the rise and development of sects and churches include a wide range of most interesting subjects such as the story of Methodism, developments within Quakerism, intimate glimpses from within a Pentecostal sect, and the coming of the Holy Rollers to a normally conservative community.

Dr. Boisen's concern is really wider than the presentation and defense of his central theme, and so there are a number of sections in the book which, while well worth reading, are not directly relevant to that theme. Some of these are valuable because of the care with which the analysis has been done, such as the chapter, accompanied by a chart, which deals with the characteristics of typical American churches. Others are frankly intriguing, for example, the section which gives what might be called the sociologist's criteria for distinguishing between true and false prophets. Still others will induce a mild form of shock, like the chapter in which the central tenets of American Protestantism are briefly summarized and calmly submitted, one by one, to the tests of validity which a psychologist and sociologist would apply.

The book closes with a summary of the conclusions to be drawn from the entire study, which includes a noteworthy and challenging critique of the procedures for perpetuating religious faith and for dealing with our present crisis. We are reminded that crisis experiences are pregnant with possibility, but that they may either make or break. "They force men to think and feel intensely regarding the things that matter most." But the reactions may be negative and the outcome disastrous. For example, war as an experience of social crisis has never issued in religious quickening. Among those elements which the author would hold up for special emphasis, he gives high place to the concept of the Christian church as a living fellowship above all else. This he feels to be basic as he appraises the critical demands of the present time.

Some who read the book will disagree with the writer's assumptions as to the nature of religious experience; some will question the adequacy of his formula for interpreting religious movements; but all who read will be stimulated to give further thought to the basic questions he raises.

FRANK W. HERRIOTT

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The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States. By Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. xvi, 527 pp. $5.50.

This substantial book by two professors of history at Columbia University can be recommended unreservedly to all who are interested in American higher education. Filling a largely unmet need in historical literature, the volume combines distinguished scholarship with admirable style and should be "required reading" for persons entering the teaching profession. Part I, "The Age of the College," by Professor Hofstadter, traces the development of academic freedom from the medieval universities through the mid-nineteenth century. In Part II Professor Metzger describes "The Age of the University" in terms of the problems raised by Darwinism, the influence of German thought, Big Business, and the issues of loyalty in World War I.

The Development of Academic Freedom is a massive work, carefully documented from primary sources wherever possible. While it is earnestly to be hoped that the book will have a wide audience in the larger American community, it is more likely that the members of the academic community will be the chief readers. On this assumption, the lack of a bibliography—in a study otherwise so complete—is an unfortunate omission. While there are few points at which the interested reader will not find suggestive references in the notes, the usefulness of the work would have been enhanced by the inclusion of a comprehensive list of sources.

The book is a contribution to intellectual history brought to focus in terms of the growth of the idea of freedom in the work of the academic community. During the Renaissance various techniques were employed to isolate certain areas of thought from the consequences of faith in order to encourage genuinely free inquiry. Certain Puritan elements are seen later to have taken up the Occamist divorcement of faith and learning in the interest of experimental examination of nature. Despite these developments in the English Nonconformist Academies, and despite the fact that it was not science per se which threatened religious orthodoxy, science flourished chiefly outside the universities.

The key, however, to the development of academic freedom did not lie with particular groups which may have been willing to use science

as a buttress to their theology. Rather, the development came about in connection with a change in the conception of the function of education. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century the teacher was largely a "conserver" of past wisdom. As the work of research became increasingly central to the university's task, the need for academic freedom as it is today understood became increasingly imperative. The problems attending this redefinition of the nature of true learning, although anticipated by Hofstadter's history, constitute the burden of Metzger's story. Incidentally, the unity achieved by this book speaks well for the occasional joint authorship. In the specialized competence of both historians the reader enjoys the best of two worlds in one volume.

The authors' handling of spokesmen for religion—who were markedly more inflexible in their response to the challenge of Darwinism than they had been at earlier times—is most heartening. Informed by the best of contemporary scholarship, the Columbia professors reject the practice of earlier historians of selecting for emphasis only those aspects of the past which conformed to their "modernist" presuppositions. While Hofstadter and Metzger do not whitewash the church, they do demonstrate a more positive role for religious leaders in the development of academic freedom than might have seemed appropriate at first thought. The several discussions of the relationship of committment (political or religious) to competence raises significant questions for those who would today be both theological and tolerant.

This is certainly the key issue now among persons of religious committment who find their vocation in academic life. The authors offer no discussion of this or of other specific contemporary problems involving academic freedom. (Their assignment was exclusively historical. Discussion of present "issues" was reserved to a companion volume by Robert MacIver.) However, they adduce evidence that, while the university as "the market-place of ideas" cannot be used to designate an official and persistent attitude of Christendom toward its universities, there have always been thinkers and experimenters who proceeded into new territory on the assumption that what they found there by honest search would not be to God's dishonor.

While specific responsibility for the book under review rests upon the authors, they were assisted at preliminary stages by the distinguished members of the American Academic Freedom Project, of

which Columbia's Dean Hacker was the Executive Secretary. This unique project, reflecting the theme of the Columbia Bicentennial, was financed by a grant from the Louis M. Rabinowitz Foundation.

David J. Maitland

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The Church in Soviet Russia. By Matthew Spinka. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. xi, 179 pp. $3.25.

This is an extremely interesting and careful book and should be read attentively by all those persons, clergy and laity, who are engaged in promoting understanding with the Church in the Soviet Union. Professor Spinka is not personally sympathetic with the Orthodox position. He could scarcely be, since he is in the tradition of the Czech Protestants. At the same time, he is an accurate student and not deceived by the blandishments of the Soviet arguments.

He deals with the Church frankly through the attitudes of the three Patriarchs, Tikhon, Sergei, and Alexei, and his judgments are fundamentally sound. The role of Tikhon was especially difficult, because he was Patriarch at the time when the power of the Communists was just being established. He refused to put the Church at the disposal of the White movement, but Dr. Spinka realizes that the Sobor and the Patriarch would have clashed with the Provisional Government, had it remained in power. It is very possible that Tikhon, at least in the beginning, based his policy toward the Soviet regime on that of Cardinal Mercier, and that his goal was the establishment of such relations between Church and State as exist in the United States. But the Soviet regime did not want that, and Tikhon, at the end of his career, really proclaimed a doctrine of non-interference of the two parties.

That was not to be, and Sergei could only secure the legitimization of the power of the Patriarch by going further and providing that the Church would actively support the state in its policies, almost including its policy of atheism. That policy led him to greater and greater concessions, and these became sufficient to justify Stalin in approving his appointment as Patriarch in 1943, even though Sergei made no attempt to carry out even the canonical regulations prescribed at the

Sobor of 1917, and there has been no expression by the Church in the USSR of any approval of Sergei's course.

Alexei has gone even further and has shown not the slightest hesitation to approving the most outrageous lies of Soviet propaganda. In his gullibility he has perhaps been exceeded only by Metropolitan Nikolai of Krutitse. Alexei has, in fact, done more than this. Either on his own initiative or on the suggestion of Stalin and Karpov, Minister for Orthodox Church Affairs in the Soviet government, he has revived the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome and, for all intents and purposes, has read out of the Christian world not only the Pope as the Bishop of the First Rome but also the Greek world headed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, the Anglican Communion, and all of Protestantism, except perhaps Professor J. L. Hromadka, of Czechoslovakia, who has declared the West spiritually bankrupt. Professor Spinka is especially good in describing the international machinations of the Patriarch of Moscow, which fully supplement the efforts of the Soviet regime to establish itself as the central force in the world and to recognize the Vatican and the United States as the two opponents which it must overthrow to obtain world hegemony and control.

Professor Spinka, by the nature of his statement of the problem, does not, of course, consider whether the renewed growth of religion in Moscow is the result of an increase in popular belief for religious motives or a fusion of Russian chauvinism and pride in a regime which has brought the Russians to a height of power that they had never before reached. He realizes clearly that the Church is now a willing tool of Soviet politics, and that its administration has reached a degree of sycophancy never before attained. Yet he still hopes for the preservation of "holy Russia," because "the rank and file of the believers have always lived their religious life apart from, and often in opposition to, their official leaders, and therefore a similar situation may emerge under the Soviets" (pp. 153-154).

The author has thrown much new light on the complicated events after the death of Tikhon and the defeat of the attempts of the radical reformers in the Living Church and allied groups, but he has paid no attention to the efforts to establish an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church or independent Orthodox Churches in the Baltic republics and Finland, although he does mention the efforts of Alexei to

secure control of the latter. It might also be interesting to have some more details of the actions of the Methodist Bishop Blake at the Second All-Russian Sobor in 1923.

Yet these are relatively minor omissions, and we can be only grateful that Professor Spinka has brought together in a consistent and logical manner the story of the efforts of the Russian Orthodox to secure independence of the State after the fall of tsarism, and the way in which the Church has been plunged into still greater dependence and has become, in its higher posts, the very definite and even willing tool of the atheistic and imperialistic government in the Kremlin.

Clarence A. Manning

Columbia University

BOOK NOTES

Recent Discoveries in Bible Lands. By William Foxwell Albright. New York: Published by The Biblical Colloquium by special arrangement with Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1955. 136 pp. Chronological Table. $1.00.

The first edition of this valuable survey was published as a Supplement to Young's *Analytical Concordance to the Bible* in 1936. Since that time new vistas have been opened—great discoveries that have tremendously enriched our knowledge and understanding of the Ancient Near East, and particularly of Syria and Palestine in the first two millennia B.C. The revised, and substantially enlarged, second edition of the Supplement is a lucid, well-balanced and concise account of those discoveries and their bearing on the Old and New Testament. A glance at the titles of the twenty-four chapters, embracing the story of the material and epigraphic discoveries and their evaluation from Egypt to Asia Minor and from Palestine to Persia, demonstrates the wealth of information included between the paper covers of this small volume. Occasionally the author provides fresh insights into old problems, such as his exposition of the biblical creation, the date and route of the Exodus, and new renderings of some of the Lachish letters.

The writer knows of no other "survey" that is as thorough, up-to-date, and reliable as the *Recent Discoveries in Bible Lands.* Professor Albright is to be congratulated for having placed this store of information in the hands of all those interested in biblical studies.

I. M.

The Universal Bible. Translated by Solomon Schonfeld. Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books, Inc., 1955. 186 pp. $2.40.

In this book Dr. Schonfeld emphasizes the fact that, throughout its history, Judaism has insisted on the equal religious status of non-Jews with Jews. Non-Jews, who in traditional Jewish literature are called "Sons of Noah," were expected to observe the "Seven Noachian Laws." These were, specifically, abstention from (1) idolatry (which Judaism condemns not so much as false religion as false morality), (2) blasphemy, (3) incest, (4) murder, (5) theft, (6) the eating of flesh cut from a living animal, and, in addition, (7) the obligation to uphold the administration of justice. These "righteous among the nations of the world" are said to "participate in the world to come" the same as Jews who live up to the principles of their religion. There is, the author maintains, no "exclusive salvation" for Jews. Indeed, humanity at large is not required to accept Hebrew concepts of monotheism; the emphasis is on good deeds rather than creedal conformity, and thus there is provided a framework for a universal religion.

The author undertook to prepare "The Universal Bible" by translating anew all those passages of the Pentateuch which apply to man at large, and

omitting those which are relevant to Jews only, such as the celebration of certain festivals, the dietary laws, etc. He then endeavors to show that present-day practice has fallen below the standards of the Laws of Noah, and adds sixty-four notes, many of which contain trenchant criticism of contemporary attitudes and behavior patterns.

We are indebted to Dr. Schonfeld for his painstaking collection of pertinent material from Rabbinical sources, but, in the opinion of this reviewer, he has set out to prove too much. It is questionable, to say the least, whether exegesis may fitly be substituted for translation, and particularly, whether it is appropriate to compare the broad principles of the Noachian Laws with excrescences of modern living conditions, such as polygamy, cruelty to animals, capital punishment, racial inequality, etc. His cavalier manner of discussing, in capsule summaries, psychoanalysis, capitalism, and democracy, would gain the approval of very few.

MOSES JUNG

The Key to Ephesians. By EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956. xvi, 75 pp. $2.50.

The reviewer is one of the ancients who worked through the Letter to the Ephesians in Dr. Goodspeed's Chicago seminar. He began his studies already convinced that the involved style of the Letter, its highly developed doctrine of the Church, its manifest dependence on Colossians, and its anachronistic veneration for "the holy apostles and prophets," were evidence that it had been written by some gifted admirer of the apostle Paul. But the Letter remained an enigma. What was its occasion? Why had it been written? Even those who maintained its authenticity, on the grounds that its vocabulary and ideas are Pauline and that "we know of no one but Paul in the first century who had the genius to have written it," were driven to call it a meditation couched in the language of prayer.

When Dr. Goodspeed distributed page proofs of his arrangement of the Greek text of Ephesians, with Colossians and other Pauline parallels in adjoining columns, and asked members of his seminar to test his hypothesis with him, most of us caught his enthusiasm and found an answer to what had seemed an insoluble puzzle. The author of Ephesians had prepared his encyclical as an introduction to Paul's collected letters. Probably he himself had been the collector. Probably he was a resident of Colossae, long familiar with the letter Paul had written to that congregation in the Lycus valley. Possibly the publication of Luke-Acts, with its stirring reminder to the Church at large of the career of the great apostle, had awakened a new interest in Paul and had suggested the centers in which extant letters might still be found. Like the encyclical that is prefixed to the letters to the seven churches in the later Book of Revelation (which may have been modelled on it), Ephesians was intended to commend the individual letters of Paul to the whole Church as a body of quasi-scriptural literature with an ecumenical message.

Dr. Goodspeed, now the "grand old man" of American New Testament letters (in his buoyant youthfulness he might resent that appellation!), has often returned to his thesis of twenty years ago, notably in his *Introduction to the New Testament* (1937). By using the ASV text (more literal than his own translation or the RSV), he now presents the evidence for non-Greeks to inspect and summarizes it in an introductory essay in twenty-one succinct theses. Dr. Goodspeed would be the first to concede that some embellishments of his hypothesis may be open to question, e.g., that the Onesimus of the Letter to Philemon is the Bishop Onesimus of Ephesus mentioned by Ignatius, the collector and redactor of the Pauline corpus, and the author of Ephesians, but he can take much satisfaction in the knowledge that he has helped many of us, both here and in Great Britain, to see a very important New Testament document for the first time in its proper context.

S. MacLean Gilmour

Elias Hicks: Quaker Liberal. By Bliss Forbush. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. xxii, 355 pp. $5.50.

Bliss Forbush strikes two fine balances in this biography of Elias Hicks. He combines meticulous documentary research with good literary craftsmanship. He blends the story of a man's life with a clear account of the context of that life, including the theological context. The result is a readable and informative work, which makes understandable the development of the great American Quaker liberal and throws much light on the basic issues underlying the Quaker schism of the 1820's. The leisurely pace of the book in a way serves to reflect the slower tempo of an earlier day, though at times it seems a bit too deliberative and repetitive.

Elias Hicks (1748-1830) was in many ways typical of the leadership of American Quakerism in its first two centuries. He earned his living by his hands as carpenter and farmer, but was frequently minuted by Quaker Meetings for the itinerant ministry, and spent long periods on extensive journeys visiting Friends. Hicks' sincerity, eloquence, and spiritual insight soon set him in a place of peculiar eminence, however, and he became one of the most striking figures in Quakerism. "Immense audiences flocked to hear him, Quaker and non-Quaker" (p. 160). A visitor from England said of him, "His appearance is simple, old fashioned and patriarchal, and he pours forth in his public discourses, in an astonishing and animated flow of plain, but powerful and penetrating language, a train of arguments that lingers, and sentiment that warms upon whatever it touches" (p. 162). There was also something of the prophet in him; this aspect of his ministry showed itself especially in his vigorous anti-slavery work.

The book is more than the biography of an important leader, however, for in describing the way Hicks emerged as leader of Liberal Quakerism, it makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of both American Quakerism and American religion in general. Liberal and Orthodox Quakers

both claimed to be the true interpreters of the Quaker heritage, but both were decisively influenced by moods of their time. The one side drank of the currents of rationalism; the other side was touched by the tide of evangelicalism, then reaching flood proportions throughout the Protestant world. Thus both sides had departed somewhat from the faith of their fathers, yet "Neither party to the conflict possessed historical insight, both claimed to represent primitive Quakerism" (p. 242). Though the author would like us to see that, in many ways, Hicks was quite close to early Quakerism, yet he explains how he ". . . added a note not found among first-generation Quakers—the place of reason" (p. 196). In the heat of conflict, Hicks was pushed farther to the left than probably he would otherwise have gone. Finally Liberal and Orthodox Friends could no longer understand each other, and separation was inevitable. The story of the schism itself, with its interesting variant patterns (in Philadelphia the liberal majority was separatist; in New York the evangelical minority broke free), is presented.

The "Foreword," by Frederick B. Tolles, declares that Hicks as preacher demands comparison with Edwards and Whitefield, and as liberal deserves to stand in the same company as Channing and Emerson. While it is doubtful that the material of the book supports such contentions, still an important figure in American religious history has been set before us in clear light, and our understanding of a major schism at a crucial period in our development has been much deepened.

R. T. H.

Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin America. By James G. Maddox. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. xi, 139 pp. $3.50.

Thanks to a Ford Foundation grant the National Planning Association, through its Special Policy Committee on Technical Cooperation in Latin America, was able to sponsor the collection of the data for this important book. Dr. Maddox is a former lecturer in economics at Harvard and is now Latin American specialist on the American Universities Field Staff. For the first time there have been made available in published form the main facts concerning the programs of education, health, agriculture, and social service undertaken by United States religious organizations in Latin America.

Out of the 300 United States religious agencies which send missionaries abroad, 175 have work in Latin America. In 1952 these agencies had practically 5300 missionaries in Latin America, of which 3923 were Protestants and 1359 Roman Catholics. About 40% of this missionary effort has to do with technical service, that is, in the fields of education, health, agriculture, and social service, involving an annual expenditure of from $8,000,000 to $10,000,000. Sixty-six Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish agencies sponsor over 1600 projects of which 1300 are schools, 119 hospitals and clinics, and 43 agricultural, and these involve about 2000 missionaries.

At the time the survey was made technical co-operation agencies of the U. S. Government employed 700 U. S. persons, and the funds involved amounted to over $20,000,000. As Dr. Maddox remarks, "In terms of manpower the activities of religious groups are nearly three times as great as those of the Government but the dollars available to them are less than half the sums which the Government contributes to its own technical co-operation programs in Latin America." Thus, religious organizations have led the way in the field of technical assistance. The Latin American governments are entering this field more and more, either independently, or assisted by the United States.

As a result of a visit to seven Latin American countries, Dr. Maddox was able to see many of these projects firsthand, and he not only describes in detail some typical cases but also gives his evaluation and helpful recommendations toward improvement. U. S. Government agencies, corporations, and foundations interested in technical assistance in our rapidly changing world, will profit greatly by this careful analysis of what religious agencies are doing in Latin America. It will also serve as a useful source of information for religious agencies.

W. Stanley Rycroft

Secularism Is the Will of God. By Horace M. Kallen. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1956. 233 pp. $4.00.

Professor Kallen calls his book with the provocative title a theologico-political tractate. It is indeed just that—or, rather, it is a series of tractates, ranging in length from one to twenty pages. Many of the thirty chapters might stand alone as separate treatises. The connection between them is sometimes tenuous, but they challenge the reader to thought and study. The common thread of argument is the defense of secularism as the basic American idea in religion. Secularism is defined in many ways, often with adroit connotations—"equal liberty for all faiths and special privileges for none," "equality of the unlike, and parity of the unequal," "the moral equivalent of the war of faiths," "faith in reason guarantees the freedom of faith." Secularism is equated with the inalienable rights of equal liberty in religion, with the laws of nature, with democracy, and, as the title pronounces, with the will of God.

The common threats to the American tradition of secularism and pluralism are Communism and, especially, Roman Catholicism, a "red authoritarianism of the left and a black authoritarianism of the right." Kallen pleads throughout that the religious war of all against all should be replaced with the secular peace that assures equal rights and freedoms by all to each. His goal is not merely freedom from coercion but co-operative respect, not only "to live and let live" but also "to live and help live."

To this reviewer Professor Kallen's writing is more effective when he

marshals his wide historical and philosophical scholarship to do battle on the political front than when he engages in sometimes abstruse manipulation of metaphysical concepts on the theological front. The historical insights in the chapter on secularism and humanism seemed especially useful for a reappraisal of education and secularism.

R. Freeman Butts

Pandora's Box: The Changing Aspects of a Mythical Symbol. By Dora and Erwin Panofsky. New York: Pantheon Books (Bollingen Series, LII), 1956. 158 pp., illustrated. $4.00.

Pandora's box (which was neither a box nor Pandora's) is as familiar an item in our humanistic legacy as Nero's fiddle or Diogenes' lantern. To trace the ramifications of the literary and artistic exploitations of the symbol from Hesiod's classic account onwards is to achieve a capsule history of western religious belief and artistic taste, and of the migration of ideas. The Latins virtually ignored Pandora; it was Erasmus who transformed the original vat into a box and gave it currency in northern (but not Italian) literature. The bird attached to the box became the acknowledged symbol of hope, and the calamities which Pandora's curiosity released came to be figured as the Seven Deadly Sins. The various ideas and types associated with Pandora received characteristic romantic, classicist, and Victorian transformations, and served as texts for philosophic conceits and dramatic representations.

With exact and far-ranging learning, carried with easy grace and illuminated by an amplitude of apposite illustration, Professor and Mrs. Panofsky trace these vicissitudes and make their quest as entertaining as a *jeu d'esprit,* as absorbing as a "whodunit," and as informing as a monograph. These learned scholars naturally never carry speculation beyond what unimpeachable evidence will support; what may particularly intrigue the readers of this *Review* is the possibility that the recurrent analogy to Eve and her part in the Fall is based on something more fundamental than fortuitous coincidence, and that even the Seven Deadly Sins may, in fact, be a true concretization of Hesiod's calamities.

Moses Hadas

Religions, Mythologies, Folklores: An Annotated Bibliography. By Katharine Smith Diehl. New Brunswick, N. J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1956. 315 pp. $6.50.

The compilation of such an ambitious work entails a great deal of labor, and it is a pity that the results are not more impressive. The most serious criticism is the book's lack of balance. The Judaeo-Christian tradition is accorded almost four times as much space as all the other world religions together. The Ancient Near East is omitted practically altogether, except for about four pages on Egypt, from which the works of Breasted are missing.

(Kramer's *Sumerian Mythology,* the only work on Mesopotamia, appears, oddly enough, under Egypt.) One looks in vain for Albright, Pritchard, Heidel, etc. Many outmoded or inferior works take up space which might better have been given to their superiors. In short, the work of selection, unfortunately, was not done under very expert scholarly supervision.

The Migration of Symbols. By COUNT GOBLET D'ALVIELLA. New York: University Books, 1956. xxiii, 277 pp. 161 illustrations. $5.00.

This photo-offset reproduction of a work published in 1894 is most welcome. Its author, the first professor of the history of religions at the Brussels Free University, was a pioneer in the scientific study of symbols, and his book is called by his successor at Brussels, Professor R. Kreglinger, "one of the foundation of religious archeology." In his introduction to the first edition, Sir George Birdwood praises the author for "pursuing his investigations on a severely inductive basis," thus raising this field of inquiry to the status of a science, once and for all.

Jñānaprasthāna-Śāstra of Kātyāyanīputra. Vol. I. Retranslated into Sanskrit from Chinese Version of Hiuan Tsang by ŚĀNTI BHIKṢU ŚĀSTRĪ. Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1955. 198 pp. Rs. 12.

This important work belongs to a group of Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism of which the Sanskrit originals are lost. It exists, however, in two Chinese translations, the one by Hiuan Tsang dating from the seventh century. The present volume comprises approximately one fourth of the entire work. It contains a Foreword by Dr. P. C. Bagchi, Director of Research Studies for Visvabharati, explaining the importance of such a retranslation for the comparative study of the Abhidharma, in which he refers to a study made from the Chinese translations by Professor Takakusu (JPTS, 1904-5, pp. 67 ff.).

The Old Testament since the Reformation. By EMIL G. KRAELING. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. 320 pp. $5.00.

This very useful book, by a veteran Old Testament scholar, furnishes the necessary background for a proper understanding of certain tendencies in contemporary theology, by tracing the positions of eminent Protestant thinkers from Luther and Calvin down to Barth and his fellow existentialists. Chapter Seven, "The Transition to the Modern Situation," is especially interesting for its account of the impact of nineteenth century science, the German "higher criticism," archeological discoveries, etc., culminating in the secularistic viewpoint of Wellhausen and his followers. The value of the book for the student is enhanced by twenty-six pages of Notes, and indexes of Subjects, Names, and Scripture Passages.

Jesus. By Charles Guignebert. New York: University Books, Inc., 1956. xii, 563 pp. $6.00.

We are again indebted to University Books, Inc. for making available an outstanding work long out of print in an English translation. "In bringing it back into print, the publisher is well aware of the pressures against it but believes that these will be countered by those who seriously seek the truth." These pressures to leave the book out of print are the result of its disruptive effect on the traditional picture of Jesus as Son of God and Second Person of the Trinity. The author's complete historical objectivity is bitter medicine to the ultra-orthodox, but a refreshing draught to the searcher after truth.

The Mystery of the Woman. Edited by Edward D. O'Connor, C.S.C. Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1956. x, 150 pp. $2.75.

The five essays by eminent Catholic theologians contained in this volume were delivered as lectures at Notre Dame University in 1954. They deal with the three dogmas of the Church regarding the Blessed Virgin: Mary as Mother of God, the Immaculate Conception, and the Assumption; with the cult of Mary in various periods of American history; and, finally, with the founding of Notre Dame in her honor. The Introduction states that the book's "primary intent is to introduce Our Lady to fellow Americans not of our faith in a way that might give them some insight into Mary's place in our Catholic life." The book is delightfully illustrated with woodcuts by Peter Stavroulakis.

A Complete Index of The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. By Roy J. Deferrari and Sister M. Inviolata Barry. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1956. 386 pp. $20.00.

This truly monumental work should prove of the greatest value to students in the field of scholastic philosophy. It is the second part of a "tremendous twofold project . . . a work of sixteen years duration and involving one and a half million cards," of which the first part, *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas,* was published in 1948. One can only marvel at the stupendous industry, devotion, and careful scholarship which have gone into its making!

The Life of Man with God. By Thomas Verner Moore, Carthusian. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. xiv, 402 pp. $3.95.

Before his entrance into a Carthusian monastery in Spain in 1947, the author had lived an extremely active life in the medical field, serving in the Medical Corps in World War I, and later as Professor of Psychology and Psychiatry in several colleges and universities. His book is the result of a questionnaire submitted to a great variety of people, both religious and secular. "Thus the whole spectrum of the spiritual life is covered: the prob-

lems of the steamfitter no less than the housewife and the monk." Needless to say, it suffers from a certain one-sidedness, in that the spiritual life is conceived in the limited Catholic pattern, so different from the Protestant view of "the life with God."

Renouvellement de la pensée. By André Schlemmer. Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1956. 110 pp. 300 frs.

These profound reflections on the crisis in the world of thought in our times are the work of an eminent physician who is described as "a Christian doctor," which means for him "not merely a Christian practicing medicine, a medicine identical with that of his materialistic colleagues," but a doctor in the ancient Greek tradition, who is also a priest. He diagnoses our crisis as a religious crisis and prescribes a "renewing of the mind," in the sense of a new understanding of man in relation to God and to nature. The future development of medicine must follow the line of a broader and deeper knowledge not only of man, but of *men,* of individual men in their own peculiar natures.

The Role of Philosophy in the Catholic Liberal College. Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXX. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1956. 247 pp. $3.50.

This volume consists of six papers and the round table discussions of them, mainly by teachers of philosophy from various Catholic universities and colleges. The exception is the Association Address by Mortimer J. Adler, a non-Catholic Thomist, on the subject "Controversy in the Life and Teaching of Philosophy." In his "Greetings" delivered at the opening meeting, Archbishop Karl J. Alter, of Cincinnati, attacks the systems of philosophy current in the great universities and asks, "Is it not possible to infiltrate in sufficient numbers the faculties of some of the leading universities and introduce the Thomist or Neo-scholastic system of thought?" This would, he is confident, "do much to ventilate the stuffy atmosphere . . . on many a campus" (!).

John Dewey's Thought and Its Implications for Christian Education. By Manford George Gutzke. New York: King's Crown Press, 1956. xv, 270 pp. $4.00.

In his Preface, the author states his purpose as an attempt "to explore the possibility and the consequence of utilizing the operation of intelligence in the deliberate propagation of the Christian message and the culture of Christian experience." For this he has chosen the instrumentalist philosophy of Dewey, believing that "the insights Dewey has set forth are applicable to the problems of education in religion, even in the Christian religion." His final conclusion is that "religious experience can be initiated, guided, promoted, enriched, and shared by the operation of experimental intelligence in the

construction and employment of suitable educational techniques in the use of instrumentalities or procedures designed for that purpose," in short, by the use of "art" in Dewey's sense of the word.

History of the World's Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations. By CLARENCE PROUTY SHEDD and others. New York: Association Press, 1956. xvii, 746 pp. $6.00.

In his Foreword the late John R. Mott, President of the World's Alliance for over twenty years and one of the pioneers of the Ecumenical Movement, says of the book: "It is the thrilling story of the countless bands of young men of all nations and races whose daring initiative created, maintained, and extended around the world the World's Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations." In Part I, "Formative Years, 1844-1878," we have the record of the pioneering phase, beginning with "meetings of young men" in the Netherlands in 1586, and similar groups in other parts of Europe in the seventeenth century. Part II, "Expanding Vision, 1878-1913," begins with the establishment of a central international committee by the VIIIth World Conference in Geneva and ends with the Edinburgh Conference in 1913. Part III, "In the Midst of Turmoil, 1913-1954," deals with the activities of the World's Alliance in a world torn apart by two world wars. It is, indeed, a "thrilling story" of lay leadership in the Christian world, especially in the Ecumenical Movement.

Billy Graham. By STANLEY HIGH. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956. 274 pp. $3.95.

This "Personal Story of the Man, His Message, and His Mission," to quote the book's sub-title, is written by an editor of *The Reader's Digest,* and reflects that periodical's somewhat naïve and uncritical attitude toward religious phenomena. In Chapter 13, the author asks, "Does It Last?" This question he attempts to answer by an account of a visit to England in 1955, a year after the London Crusade. He admits that it would be impossible to discover statistically what proportion of the 38,000 "decisions for Christ" were permanent, but he maintains, quoting an eminent British churchman, that "there is another answer that is . . . of great meaning in the future: the atmosphere and attitude of England toward religion have perceptibly changed from prevailing coldness and indifference to increasing warmth and concern." And this, if true, is certainly a great gain.

Surprised by Joy. By C. S. LEWIS. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1956. ix, 238 pp. $3.50.

This autobiography, by the eminent Professor of Medieval and Renaissance English Literature at Cambridge University, belongs in the category of "varieties of religious experience," but scarcely follows the usual pattern. His conversion experience seems to be a coldly cerebral affair, practically devoid

of the emotional crisis generally involved. To use the words of the cover blurb, "Here, rather, is a modern man who has *thought* his way through to the ultimate answer." One can but wonder. Lewis seems to be strangely unconscious of the fact that emotional disturbances of early years repressed into the unconscious might be the clue to his extraordinary "intellectual conversion."

The Faith That Rebels. By D. S. Cairns. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. xi, 260 pp. $3.00.

This book is a reprint of the sixth edition (1954) of a work first published in 1928, by the late moderator of the United Free Church of Scotland. In his Foreword to the present edition, Donald Baillie states that Cairns interpreted Christianity as "the faith that rebels" against physical as well as spiritual evil and "lays hold of the power of God which is able to give us the victory." From this viewpoint the miracles are believable as "mighty works of the Kingdom of God" made possible by human faith as exemplified in Jesus himself. Baillie finds a striking parallel between Cairn's thought and that of Karl Heim.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Ancient Religions

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Dualismo Mazdaico e "Zurvanismo." By U. Bianchi. *Studi e Materiale di Storia delle Religioni,* xxvii (1956), 102-35.

Archaeology in East Africa. By M. Ramakrishna Bhat. *The Aryan Path,* xxvii (1956), 314-18.

Oracles grecs et devins africains. A propos de "L'oracle de Delphes" par M. Delcourt. By D. Paulme. *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* cxlix (1956), 145-56.

Heracles Thasios. By F. Sokolowski. *Harvard Theological Review,* xlix (1956), 153-58.

Bulletins critiques: Philosophie religieuse des Grecs. By Édouard des Places. *Recherches de science religieuse,* xliv (1956), 113-45.

The Greeks and the Inner Man. By Royden Keith Yerkes. *Anglican Theological Review,* xxxviii (1956), 71-76.

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God and the Good in Plato. By Kelvin F. Doherty. *The New Scholasticism,* xxx (1956), 441-60.

"Euthyphron." By Michel Philibert. *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses,* xxxvi (1956), 136-46.

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Nouvelles observations sur diverses représentations du Héros Cavalier des Balkans. By Ch. Picard. *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* cl (1956), 1-26.

Sur un schème trifunctionnel dans une famille de légendes germaniques. By L. Gerschel. *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* cl (1956), 55-92.

Tracce di un arcaico essere supremo femminile nel folklore Basco. By A. Bausani. *Numen,* iii (1956), 97-110.

Tängri: Essay sur le ciel-dieu des peuples altaïques. By J.-P. Roux. *Revue d'histoire des religions,* cxlix (1956), 49-82, 197-230; cl (1956), 27-54.

A propos d'Ätügän, déesse mongole de la terre. By E. Lot-Falck. *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* cxlix (1956), 157-96.

Oriental Religions

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

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